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Introduction
"Freud views the atrocities of war as more natural than the civilized
behaviour of man," and he considers that "what we call 'peace' is, apparcnt-
ly, a period during which forces both psychic and material are dammed up."l
Even if this be true, it is not necessarily the ultimate fate of man-
kind to continue to wage war in disregard of certain international norms
which have been developed to manage violence and to limit the sufferings
of the victims of war. It is more likely that mankind can and will have
to constantly guard against the excesses of individuals, groups, govern-
mental elites, or of themselves in their treatment of fellow hi-an beings.
A receaIt U.S. Army film, "The Geneva Conventions and the Soldier",2 has
pointed out that "[w]ar sometimes brings out the beat in man--cLarity, con-
passion, self-sacrifice. Too often it brings out the worst--cruelty, bru-
tality, sadism;" and the film declares that in war it is usually harder "to
do the right thing than to do the wrong thing." Nevertheless, as the film
emphasizes, the human society rightfully expects that a soldier's and a ci-
vilian's conduct during armed conflict shall conform to certain basic norma-
tive precepts known as the law of war. But why are these expectations of
the international community not always realized in practice, and why is an
uncivilized behavior sometimes allowed to reign supreme?
There seems to be no lack of documented legal policy (goal values), nor
a lack of relevant basic expectations and demands of the international com-
munity concerning the rules for the waging of war or the protection of
1Colby, "War Crimes," 23 Mich. L. Rev. 482, 626n. 313 (1925), gaiotin,
MeCurdy, The Psychology of War. See also, "Is There a Bit of Galley In Us?",
Look, June 1, 1971, at 76-77.
2 See "My Lai Prompts New Training Film, Soldiers Get Vivid Lesson on
Geneva Code," Los Angeles Times, April 26, 1971, at I and 12; and "Wh-at
Army Is Doing to Prevent Another Hy Lal," U.S. News & World Rerort, April
12, 1971, at 6. The present author was a Pentagon adviser on this film.
.human beings involved in =-t armed conflict. But there '-rules" could, in
many cases, be expanded to cover new situations vith gicerer clarity.
It is also evident that those who engage In ar-ed violence could be made
more aware of these expectations through a greater em:phsis on education
and tactical training at all levels of the various social groupings which
populate our globe. Similarly, there does not seez to be lircking a humaai
acceptance of the need for formal judgment or condensation after the fact,
though actual judgment is sometimes confused with an individual (or a core
exclusive oriented) morality and is usually sparse, ad hoc and without the
benefit of an established international sanctioning process. What seems a
critical need, however, is not so much the creation of a highly centralized
judicial and police machinery 3 as the need for a new focus. A focus not on
rule formation or judgment, but on law effectiveness. 4 And there is a need
3 Such machinery might tend to be state elite dominated and unresponsive
to more inclusive interests. See G. H. Gottlieb, The Court of Man (The Court
of Ilan Foundation, 1973).
4 The phrase "law effectiveness" should be explained. By this, the au-
thor means the actual effectiveness of law as an authoritative guide for the
regulation of human conduct or the actual extent of an implementation of
shared legal expectations into human conduct (a conjunction of authority
and control). A focus on the actual effectiveness of law moves beyond in-
qui-ies into rule content or judgment (adjudication) and is useful tor a
"preventive law" orientation in that the focus considers the human response
to rules or the degree of effective implementation of rules into human con-
duct (i.e., by asking such questions as: How does law function in the so-
cial context? What impact does a rule have on human conduct? Are the po-
licies behind the rule effectively realized?). The focus on law effective-
ness is a useful focus for a "preventive law" approach since considerations
of law effectiveness are tied more to the ongoing social process and the im-
pact of law on human actors than are focuses on appellate court decisions
or any adjudicative process (since the latter are more after-the-fact or
tesponsive in focus or at least not always attuned to what pragmatists might
refer to as "actual practice" and the ongoing social events, needs, and ex-
pectancies). For a related use of the term "effectiveness", see Potter, Com-
ment, "Bases and Effectiveness of International Law, 1968," 63 Am. J. Int'l
Law 270-272 (1969). lie states that most persons involved with internation-
al law are preoccupied with problems of rule content which are not at all
as impoitant today as the problems which concern "the bases and the effec-
tikveness of the 'law' and what is to be done about it all," id. at 270.
This is another way of stating, I suppose, that how and why rules are or
are not implemented into actual conduct should be the most important con-
cern for the international lawyer today. And others have also made a shift
In focus toward inquiries into law effectiveness or law implementation in
for an expanded focus on all aspects of the sanctioning process and a con-
cern for the more efficacious functioning of law in social process. In nor-
ticular, there is a need for a shared supervision of man's behavior in var
with actual impact upon himian perspectives and conduct. It is a need which
is closely related to the ability of men to guard against their own excesnes,
and it stems from a realization that new rules, prancing diplomacy, and epi-
sodic judgment cannot protect us from ourselves-that responsibility remains
our oim and requires, at a minimum, a broader sanctioning approach. However,
perhaps unlike Freud, it is believed that such a protection is within our
grasp if we only choose to reach out.5 And this new protection is actually
less idealistic (therefore, more contextually realistic) than an exaggera-
ted reliance on rules themselves (or even the leader-saviours), for It i
based upon man himself.
the area of human rights. See, e.g., J. Carey, UN Protection of Civil and
Political Rights (1970); U.N. Sec. Gen. Report, "Respect for Human Rights
in Armed Conflicts," 25 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/8052 (1970); McDougal, Lass-
well, Chen, "Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-
Oriented Inquiry," 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 237 (1969); Schwelb, "Civil and Po-
litical Rights: The International Measures of Implementation," 62 Am. J.
Int'l L. 827 (1968); and Sohn, "United Nations Machinery for Implementing
Human Rights," 62 Am. J. Int'l L. 909 (1968). Perhaps others would feel
more comfortable with the concept of law "efficacy," see H. L. A. Hart,
The Concept of Law 100-101 (1961); cr "policy realization," see Moore,
"Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell,"
54 Va. L. Rev. 662, 666, 669 n.8 and 671-672 ("law is seen as an instru-
ment for effectuating community policies and is good or bad according to
its effectiveness in realization of those policies," and the "appraisal
function" is to be utilized for a determining of the efficacy of law.
See id. at 671 and 685, n. 29). See also Lasswell, "Toward Continuing
Appraisal of the Impact of Law on Society," 2 Rutgers L. Rev. 645 (1967);:
and McDougal, Lasswell, Reisman, "The World Constitutive Process of Au-
th6ritative Decision," 19 J. cf Legal Ed. 253, 258 (1957), stating: "le-
gality must go beyond words to expectations substantially corraborated by
deeds," and recognizing that law is actually a conjunction of authority
and control in some unspecified degree. It is exactly this sort of con-
joining which the author has in mind, or the greater serving of policy,
the greater conjoining of goal values and practice in actual context, and
the efficacy of expectation.
5For evidence of a related optimism, see Reisman, "Private Armies in
a Global War System: Prologue to Decision," 14 Va. J. Int'l L. 1, 35 (19-
73); and McDougal, Lasswell, Reisman, strpra note 4, at 254-255.
6 See McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, "Theories About International
Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence," 8 Va. J. Int'l L. 188,
194 (1968).
Moreover, although "one may observe... in all parts of the world an
increasing awareness and concern that mankind has not yet created the le-
gal institutions, or processes of authoritative decision, adequate to clari-
fy and secure cor-uon interests under conditions of contemporary interdeoen-
dence,''6 the very fact of increasing awareness and concern points to the in-
creasing feasibility of cooperative processes for lav implementation which
are mwore useful than present mechanisms though far short of a highly cen-
tralized world judiciary and police forcc. Perhaps, it may be added, even
an expanded awareness of the types of sanctions available for the securin
of efficacious legal policy in social context will significantly add to the
feasibility of a cooperative response to needs for improved implementation.
Professors McDougal and Feliciano have stated that sanction stratcgists
might, for example, utilize suitable ideological symbols "with a view to
affecting the expectations, demands, and identifications of people in the
audience, to creating attitudes--that is, stresses or tendencies to the
commission of acts by which a particular perspective is externalized--and
to channeling and directint the existing tensions as well as the expected
response of the audience."7
Implicit in this statement is the recognition that law efficacy is
dependent upon enviromaental and predispositional conditions. Thus, if
one seeks to make legal policy more effective, the relating of legal policy
to perspectives which are actually held (a predispositional condition) and
the expansion of shared perspectives so as to more fully interrelate legal
policy and alternatives in decision to actual patterns of community perspec-
tive can more fully guarantee the actual implementation of legal policy in
social context. 8 it is this sort of insight which has led these authors
to conclude that those who seek a greater efficacy of law in social inter-
actions should focus not so much on "'permanent' panaceas in either speci-
fic institutional structure or technical principle and procedLre," as on
the need to develop:
a more comprehensive conception of a sanctioning pro-
cess that will facilitate the continuous employment
of all necessary intellectual skills in the invention
and evaluation of the detailed strategies rationally
designed for securing practicable immediate, mid-range,
and long-term goals in continually changing contexts of
conditioning factors.
9
7. cDougal, F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 317 (19-
61) [hereinafter cited as McDougal & Feliciano].
8See McDougal & Feliciano it 278, also referring to the "harnessing"
of "their perspectives to the implementation of" legal policy.
9McDougal & Feliciano at 278.
With this insight and their challenge in mind, thfs-article will seek
to explore several often interrelated sanction possibilities and to relate
institutional functions (present and potential) to such possibilities ra-
ther than seek to set up an institutional structure and to rationalize a
particular systemic "necessity" through an analysis of supportive trends
and conditioning factors. Indeed, the purpose of this article is to ex-
plore the present systems by which men could guard each other, or the sys-
tematized capacities1 0 for law implementation, through inquiry into the
operative basis of law in social and political context, present sanction
needs and system capabilities, general functional possibilities, and an
integrated analysis of certain trends and system developments. This in-
quiry will hopefully provide an opportunity for a cooperative breakthrough
in law of war effectiveness through a community adoption of a new inter-
national process for shared supervision, participation, and authoritative
response. A more effective system for implementing the law of war could
substantially contribute to general world order as well, since the adop-
tion of effective legal policy which seeks to attenuate the effects of
violence in war could directly aid in bringing about a conclusion of hos-
tilities where they do exist. At the very least, such an effort will aid
through a limiting of the degree and effect of armed violence and, thus,
will confine and manage world disorder where it does occur and provide a
basis for further normative effectiveness through cooperative effort.
Community Expectations: An Operative Base
One of the first law effectiveness considerations concerns inquiry
into the nature of international law and its operative base in the human
context.1 1 Legal policy and nbrmative principles must have a basis in
reality and in expectations shared by a significant number of persons in
"1 0By "systematized capacities," the author means the capabilities of
the formal systems or constituted authoritative processes by which law can
be implemented into actual human conduct (e.g., the United Nations sysuem).
Useful questions in this regard are: what kinds of systems do we have for
implementing law, who are the potential participants, in what arenas of so-
cial interaction, with what objectives and base values, with what competence
or capacities for functioning, and so forth.
!!As Professors McDougal and Lasswell have reminded, what an inquirer
"regards as law and how he locates it in its larger community context" is
significant since it will "dctermine how he conceives every detailed part
of his study: his framing of problems, his choice of tools and procedures,
and his recommendation of alternatives;" Lasswell & llcDougal, "Criteria
For A Theory About Law," 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 362, 376 (1971).
a given conmtmity (their legal expectations, in particular), or th1ere
is likely to be little regard for law in actual practice. Hall had early
warned:
It would be very unwise of an international lawyer
to indulge in the delusion, with which he is often 13
credited, that formulas are stronger than passions.
Of course, this warning does not preclude the use of a formula which it-
self is based upon identifiable cotunity "passions" for law and Justice
and which reflects shared expectations of the me'bers of the social group;
nor does it require a disillusionment with the lair and the attribution of
an exaggerated role to naked power. i 4 Hecdchig such a warning, in fact,
seems to require that legal formulas be based on e:pectations and that
some consideration of other types of perspective be included in realisric
and policy-serving decision.15 The problem for the international scholar
12By "legal expectations," the author means the legal expectancies of
persons or the expectancies of an existence of legal policies, "rights"",
and "duties" (expectations in the broadest sense are assumptions about
events or outcomes). "Community expectations" are those shared by m=st
all of the participants in the ongoing international legal process. Ex-
pectations are not to be confused with the demands for value outcome by
participants in a particular controversy or identifications with persons
or groups (which are the other major components oZ perspective). See Mc-
Dougal & Feliciano, at 285. See also Reisman, supra note 5, at 46, for
use of a concept of shared expectancy of "right" in connection tith the
role of authority ("expectations of what is substantively and procedural-
ly right").
1 3Hall, International Law, preface (3rd ed. 1890).
14See McDougal & Feliciano at 3-4 on the role of "authority;" and Lass-
well & McDougal, supra note 11, at 374.
151n fact, decision-makers should realize that the realistic function
of rules is not to mechanically dictate specific decision but to guide the
attention during a necessary process of choice "to significant variable
factors in typical recurring contexts of decision, [and] to serve as sum-
mary indicies to relevant crystallized community expectations, and, hence,
to permit creative and adaptive, instead of arbitrary and irrational, de-
cisions." See McDougal & Felicieno at 57.
(or the disengaged observer of the actual events who is nevertheless deeply
committed to the goal values of human dignity), then, lies in the clarif1-
cation of legal policy, the identification of other re-levant expectations
and demands, an inquiry into the responsiveness of particular formulas to
those expectations,16 and the devising of sanction strategies and institu-
tional means for the effective fulfillment of shared expectations in actual
human conduct.
Law must reflect public expectations (i.e., those which are generally
shared by the members of a community) as well as the generally shared de-
mands for value outcomes, but this does not mean that legal decisions are
to be purely "political" in nature (with all the evil connotations that
are popularly associated vith a suspected substitut6 of "political" for
"legal" bases of decision). The term "political" is com-only associated
with a form of power (control) and a connotation of decisional deference
to naked power as opposed to authoritative norms. The common conception
of "politics" is oriented toward the principles of ruling, government and
control, or the regulation of social conduct through effective power (con-
trol) relations and practices.1 7 Popular conceptions of law, on the other
hand, are more apt to invol,e inquiry into all values (power as well as:
wealth well-being, respect, rectitude, skill, enlightenment, and affcc-
tion),18 their interrelation in context, and the regulation of social con-
duct in accordance with legal policy or authoritative norms by means of a
"public order" decisional process.1 9 Thus, popular conceptions tend to
16For a proper focus on the operative base, one must also consider
the interrelationship between expectations, other aspects of the social
context, and relevant values. A comprehensive methodology utilizing phase
and value analysis can be found in the McDougal-Lasswell approach. See,
e.g., Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 11, and references cited.
17See H. Lasswell & A. Kaplan, Power and Society 75 and 117 (1950),
[hereinafter cited as Lasswell & Kaplan] concerning "politics," politi-
cal doctrine, and the political process.
18See, however, id. at xvii, stating that a comprehensive inquiry in-
to the political process must begin with the recognition that the power
process is "not a distinct and separable part of the social process, but
only the political aspect of an interactive whole.. .the social process in
its entiiety."
19"Public order" includes the more comprehensive preferred patterns
for the distribution of values and a preferred pattern of basic institu-
tions backed by sanction. See Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 11, at
375.
separate "political" (control) functions and "law" (authority) and, thus,
also leave aside some important natters of law implementation needs and
possibilities. However, there is no escape from the interdependence of
the authority and control components of social regulation through abso-
lute distinctions between (and even professional specialty differences
between) "legal" and "political" decisions.20 The legal and political
processes affect all values and both involve the uses of muthority and
control in a process of public order. Moreover, a comprehensive consi-
deration of varied perspectives within a given community (to include
Hall's "passions" and expectations about "political" and "legal" deci-
sion) is not at all a subversion of "law" and a deference to one kind
of perspective (i.e., to "passions" or "politics").21 Instead, it in-
volves an inclusion of the varied types of perspective for a more com-
prehensive consideration of this conjoining of patterns of authority
and patterns of control which we, more realistically, refer to as law 22
and which we, more realistically, seek to explore in order to achieve
some sort of insight into implementary needs and possibilities.
Where the political and legal processes are most obviously con-
joined is in the setting up of the institutional framework for autho-
ritative decision in a given community or context. This establishment
of an authorized decisional structure has been usefully referred to as
the "constitutive process" or the comprehensive process by which funda-
mental institutions of decision are constituted, maintained, modified,
2 0In fact, Professor McDougal and others have referred to the quest
for a theoretical difference between "political" and "legal" decisions
as a vacuous controversy. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories
About International Law, supra note 6, at 204. However, it does not
always appear to be useless to consider major categories of expectation
in terms of legal or political expectancy.
21others have falsely accused Professor McDougal et al of defer-
ring to political perspective over legal policy. Comnare Gottlieb, "The
Conceptual World of the Yale School of International Law," 21 World Poli-
tics 108 (1968); and Young, "International Law and Social Science: The
Contributions of Myres S. McDougal," 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 60 (1972) with
McDougal, "International Law and Social Science: A Mild Plea in Avoi-
dance," 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 77 (1972).
22On the conception of law as a mergeance of "authority" and "con-
trol" or as authoritative decision, see, e.g,. Lasswell & McDougal, su-
pra note 11, at 384.
or terminated.23 And since it is not possible absolute!7 to separaLe
"political" from "legal" process, it has been suggested that a more fruit-
ful inquiry should proceed by distinguishing between "constitutive" deci-
sions and "public order" decisions rather than "political" and "legal"
decisions.24 The point is that by focusing on shared expectations about
authoritative decisional structures and norm= we have moved beyond the
mare deference to naked power, an undue concern over "natural" behavior
(a main concern of the naturalist jurisprudential theory) or emotive quali-
ties such as "passion" (a main concern of the sensualist school of legal
"thought"). This focus also brings us far beyond simplistic notions of
how international laws and organizations function or defeatist notions
that no international organizations or institutionalized sanction possi-
bilities will predictably have any policy-serving impact upon human pers-
pectives and conduct, since we are forced by this focus to consider both
patterns of authority and control.
Further inquiry into the concept of authority should also help ao
to articulate what role expectations might play as an operative base for
law effectiveness.25 The concept of authority adopted here has as its
empirical referent the shaued "perspectives of living coamunity members-
their demands for values, their identifications with others, and their
23See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 6, at 203; McDougal,
Lasswell & Reisman, supra rote 4, at 257, stating: "The constituLive pro-
Less is authoritative power exercised to provide an institutional frme-
work for decision and to allocate indispensable functions...;" and Lass-
well & McDougal, surra note 11, at 386, stating that the constitutive
process refers to decisions which "identify and characterize the dif-
ferent authoritative decision-makers, specify and clarify basic commu-
nity policies, establish appropriate structures of authority, allocate
bases of power for sanctioning purposes, authorize procedures for making
the different kinds of decisions, and secure the continuous performance
of all the different kinds of decision functions.. .necessary to making
and administering gnneral oommunity policy."
24See, McDougal, Las"well & Reisman, supra note 6, at 204. Of course,
this dictinction includes inquiry into patterns of authority and control-
naked power decisions are, thus, further distinguished.
25Recognizing that there are many interrelated contextual variables
which condition the effectiveness of norms and institutions whether our
standpoint is mainly one of a legal, political, economic, sociological,
etc.,'nature.
expectations about the requirements of decision for securing their deman-
ded values... '"26 Here it might also be useful to disti..guish between two
types of authority so as not to lose sight of the prLary referent to au-
thority which lies in the perspectives of the entire community, although
it is recognized that authority is actually itself a dynamic product of
an interactive process. Primary authority might efer to both the living
community and to the aggregate of community perceptions with an emphasis
upon generally shared expectations rather than on the relatively more ex-
clusive oriented aggregate of demands for values by particular persons or.
the necessarily more exclusive perspectives of some elite that has been al-
located a certain measure of decisional competence by the members of that
community. Neither the elite nor the elite perspectives can be simplis-
tically equated with primary authority, since the elite never comprimises
the whole of the social group and it is the whole which is ultimately the
primary referent.2 7 Relevant community expectations, for our purposes,
would be those common to nearly all of the members of the human community
(i.e., the "generally shared" expectations); and the main focus on pri-
mary ailthority should concern those which also contain an authoritative
base in the shared expectation of legality or a commoD expectancy of ei-
ther general legal policy or actual decisional outcome (popularly con-
ceived of as an existence of "rights" and "duties") as opposed to mere
aspirations as to what the law should be.2 8 No doubt common human aspira-
26See Las-well & McfDougal, supra note 11, at 374; and McDougal, Lass-
well & 1eisman, nupra note 6, at 202-203; stating: "Authority will be
sought, not in some mysterious or transempirical source of 'obligation'
or 'validity,' but rather, empirically, in the perspectives, the genuine
expectations, of the people who constitute a given community about the
requirements for lawful decision in that community."
2 7 See MDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 4, at 256, stating:
"In the optimum public order which we recommend, the expectations of all
individuals equally comprise authority;" although in a given polity those
of an effective elite "may be the dominant element of authority."
2 8 See 1 Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's International Law 8-9 (8 ed. 1955)
[hereinafter cited as 1 Oppenheim], for the view that conscience and mo-
rality (which sometimes reflect aspirations as to what the law should be
more than expectations) lack the authoritative base of legal expectation
and that the power to make a law (authoritative norms) lies in "the com-
mon consent [or shared expectation] of the community." Power to make the
law here refering to competence (a type of allocated authority which the
present author refers to as representative authority). See also Reisman,
supra note 5, re: expectations of "right".
tions can become expectations and, thus, the basis for authoritative im-
plementation as human rights, but there are differences between the rthree
which one should keep in mind in order to avoid an intellectual confusion
concerning the nature of law and legal rights.29 Expectalions are, it
should be emphasized, the primary operative basis of law3 and, thus, the
29Note that aspirations are usually something less than legal expec-
tancies, and legal expectancies of the existence of "rights" are something
less than an existence of rights in fact (the latter being the confluence
of authority and control). Some McDougalians might place all these terms
under the category "perception-expectation" and, then, differentiate on
the basis of intensity, see Moore, supra note 4, at 666, and Lasswell,
A Pre-View cf Policy Sciences 25 (1971). But some distinction should
be made between perceptions which ara expectations (or those more in-
tensely held and"obligation"oriented) and those of a lesser quality.
It should be noted also that legal expectations are not always co-exis-"
tent with the existence of "rights" in fact. See McDougal, Lasswell &
Reisman, supr note 4, at 258 (aspirations are not the equivalent of "ex-
pectations that are substantially corroborated by deeds"). Indeed, as
Justice Holmes had early observed, when we speak of a legal "right" or
"duty" we are really speaking of "predictions" (or legal expectancies
in connection with presumed decision outcomes) "that if a man does or
omits certain things he will be made to suffer this or that way by Judg-
ment of the court.. .' See Holmes, '"Ihe Path of the Law," 10 Harv. L.
Rev. 457, 458 (1897). Note also that Holmes tried to separate morals
from law, id. at 459-462. Morals and law both relate to "right" behavior
but, Holmes felt, morals are more attuned to individual ethical stan-
dards (rectitude values) and law to shared legal expectations--but they
do interrelate. Even Holmes spoke of law as the "witness" of our moral
life or a shared morality. See also 1 Oppenheim at 8, defining morality
as something applying to "conscience" alone and not being "enforced" by
external power (but this, perhaps, ignores the enforcability of a shared
morality in a social process as in the case of traditional Chinese Fa
and Li). Professor Lasswell places morality in a category of recticude;
see Lasswell & Kaplan at 72, 82, and 87.
30 ee McDougal, Lasswell & Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space
146 (1963).
key to authority. Even this main focus could be somewhat misleading, how-
ever, since a most comprehensive conside-ation of authority would include
all patterns of authority or all aspects of perspective about the require-
ments of decision, and they are interrelated (i.e., the competence require-
ments such as who, where, when, and how, and even decisional outcome--rhe
what or the "by what criteria")). ± The complete "process of authorit.ative
decision by which a community shapes and shares its vlaues" actually in-
cludes two major patterns of authority: "first, the decisions which es-
tablish and maintain the most comprehensive process of authoritative de-
cision and, secondly, the flow of particular decisions."-j  What we ha-ve
been concerned with so far has involved both but with a primary emphasis
upon those perspectives which flow from the entire group. We also note
that authority is not a static condition, nor is it ever totally trans-
ferred to some elite. This is just one of the reasons why "the people"
are the key to effective law, and a sanctioning process which ignores
this fact is myopically bound to failure (prancing diplomatic elites to
the contrary).
The second main aspect or type of authority might be referred to as
renresent~tive authority. This would involve authority or competence
which is conditionally transferred to a group of decision-makers by the
political formula (referred to as the authoritative decision-makers es-
tablished by the constitutive Drocess-who actually encompass only an
elite of the whole community).3 3 This second form of authority is con-
stituted authority (not primary or "natural"); and it is the other main
aspect of the comprehensive process of authority or authoritative deci-
sion--the elite and the institutional framework for authoritative deci-
3 1 See Lasswell & MeDougal, supra note 11, at 384-385, stating: "By
authority we mean participation in decision in accordance with community
perspectives about who is tu make what decisions and by what criteria;
the reference is...to a certain frequency in the perspectives of the peo-
ple who constitute a given community."
3 2
See id., at 385.
33Representative authority seems to be what Professors Lasswell and
Kaplan refer to as "authority". See Lasswell & Kaplan, at 133-136. There
are alsa differences between "formal" and "effective" authority. The au-
thority most often considered here is the "formal" a,,t:hority (both pri-
mary and representative). See Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 11, at 384,
stating: "By authority we mean participation in decision in accordance
with community perspectives about who is to make what decisions and by
what criteria..." and that the appropriate criteria for decision relate
to "the score, range, and domain of the values authorized to be affected
sion. It seems preferable to refer to it as representative as opposed to
constituted, however, so as not to chance any loss of the fact that ulti-
mate authority rests within the entire group of people and that their per-
spectives are most relevant in considerations of legal efficacy since it
is they who will make the law more effective andAEltical in the ultimate
conjoining of all patterns of authority and control.34  It can be said
that decisions which are made in constituted decisional arenas (the insti-
tutional frameworks) by the proper procedures and policies for decision
are "authoritative,"135 even though only temporarily as where it is later
evident that the specific decision does not coincide with generally shared
expectations about the propriety of the specific decision outcome and it
might soon be disregarded in practice. In this case, the term "authorita-
tive" would merely refer to a propriety of institutional process in that
decisions are made by authoritative decision-makers in an appropriate man-
ner although the entire "authoritative" and "appropriate" process of deci-
and to the detailed shapings and sharings of values regarded as appropri-
ate for particular contexts." Others have referred to this state of con-
ferred decisional competence (representative authority) as "legitimacy."
See Janos, "Authority and Violence: The Political Framework of Internal
War," Internal War 130, 132 (H. Eckstein, ed., 1964).
34See Lasswell & Kaplan at 75. Note that in an optimum public or-
der "the expectations of all individuals equally comprise authority,"
and an "instrumental goal of a public order of human dignity is, of course,
the equipping of all individuals for full participation in authorita-
tive decision;" McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 6, at 256.
35See Lasswell, supra note 29, at 28; and Lasswell & McDougal, su-
pra note 11, at 384. However, Professor McDougal has captured the pre-
ferable focus by noting that the "outcomes" (decisions, rules in words)
of the prescribing fumction are merely "more particular assertions which
purport to be consistent with the (political) formula (and which, if in-
consistent, enter into the final assessment of the claims of any preten-
ded formula)." McDougal, "The Structure of Decision in a Free Society,"
Law, Science, and Policy, work papers, Chpt. 1, at 8 (Yale Law School,
1954).
sion (involving popular acceptance of the specific decision "outcome") had
not yet occurred, and the term could not relate to narticularized consent
in connection with the outcome of the institutional process. As Profesnor
Lassiell has written: "To be authoritative is to be identified as the of-
ficial or agency competent to act; to ba controllin is to be able to shave
results," 3 6 and law is the flow of authoritative decision which com=binez
elements of both authority and control.3 7 Eere, however, the author would
rather retain the emphasis on different levels or aspects of authority so
as not in any way to promote a dangerous popular assumption (shared by le-
gal positivists and certain Orellian "behaviorists") that authority is
totally merged in a decisional elite and that the function of sanction stra-
tegists is to devise means for the "control" of the rest of the population.33
36Lasswell, suora note 29, at 99 (emphasis added). See also Lasswell
& Kaplan at 133-135 (1950). If anything, the statement might be reversed
so that the word authoritative is associated with a basis in generally
shared perspective whereas to be "controlling" is to have patterns of au-
thority actually function within the decisional body or with the actor-
decision-maker who is engaged in permissible conduct.
3 7See id.; Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 11, at 384; and McDougal,
Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 14, at 200.
38This is the type of approach to law adopted by totalitarian regimes;
and the 19th Century positivistic and elitist influence on Marx and Engels
still seems to pervade, for example, the Soviet concept of law as "rules"
eminating from the ruling class (i.e., the "lawmaker" elite). See U.S.S.R.,
Contemporary International Law 32-33, 164, 167 (G. Tunkin, ed., 1969). See
also H. Arendt, Totalitarianism (Pt. III, 1968); and H. Marcuse, Soviet
Marxism-A Critical Analysis (1961). For an example of behaviorist adop-
tion of these false, positivistic notions of authority, behaviorist con-
cerns with control, and the use of otherwise alarming and important data
on human behavior, see S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority (1973). Thus,
many of the positivists, the totalitarians, and the confused or suppor-
tive behaviorists demonstrate a concentric conceptual ineptitude which
each refers to as "authority" (and which we certainly reject here). For
an exposition of related dangers and of the utility of distinction between
primury and representative authority, see also Paust, "Human Rights and
the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee," 60 Cornell L. Rev. _
(Jan. 1975); and Paust, The Concept of Norm: A Consideration of the Juris-
prudential Views of Hart, Kelsen, and MfcDougal. See also McDougal, supra
note 35.
At what point "authoritative" decision changes from "law" to hollow
decision ("naked power" or something less) due to dnacceptability of the
decision "outcome" by the commun.1-y is not the purpose of this inquiry.39
What is relevant to note here, however, is the fact that the broader group
expectations operating within an interacting process of patterns of aucho-
rity and control are a key factor and can be crystalized into legal norms
to govern conduct even in the absence of "formal" legislative acts of im-
plementation where the consensus as to the existence of the norm is fair-
ly coplete.40 And in the same way the specific legislative acts of the
past can be expanded- upon by the norm creating process of cormunity expec-
tation.41 This expansion and change can be found in general or localized
practice designed to be in conformity Twith the developing principles of
international law,4 2 though all practice is not norm creating or norm chang-
ing.43 The existence of legal rules in the absence of codal precision has
39The reader may wish to compare Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 11,
at 385 with id. at 384, and Lasswell & Kaplan at 75.
4 0See, e.g., 1 Oppenheim at 15-19. Thus, we speak of customary in-
ternational law, general principles of law, and the usages of civilized
nations (which evidence such legal expectations--indicia of legal policy
and other exp.ctancy). There is even some current Soviet acceptance of
much of this insight and, somewhat surprisingly, an identified tiend in
Soviet thinking which leaves some ronm for the recognition of shared ex-
pectations as an operative basis of law. See U.S.S.R., supra note 38, at
165, 168, 174-178, 184-185.
41See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Ger-
many, at 128 (1946), stating: "This law is not static, but by continual
adaptation follows the needs of a changing world" [hereinafter cited as
IMT]. See also 1 Oppenheim at 8, stating: "so the law can grow without
beirig expressly laid down and set by a law-giving authority;" and Advi-
sory Opinion on the Legal Consequences For States of the Continued Pre-
sence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Se-
curity Council Resolution 276 (1960), (1971] I.C.J. 13 (June 21, 1971);
and Lachs, The International Law of Outer Space," 113 Recueil des Cours
95 (1964).
42See I Oppenheim, at 26, distinguishing between custom, which is as-
sociated with the expectation of legality over a long tine period, qnd po-
litical usage, which does not itself have such an expectancy base.
43See Fare,-, C.E.I.P., The Laws of War 25 Years After Nuremberg, at
12 (May 1971), stating that the "operational substance of norms is de-
been consistently recsgnized by the courts44 and text writers;45 iadeed, it
has been recognized by international "legislators" them,,lves. 4 6 For exam-
ple, one of the codal provisions of the law of war, the Hague Convention
No. IV (1907),4 7 provides in the preamble that it was not possible to cre-
ate regulations covering all the circumastances which might arise in prac-
tice, but:
rived from the behavior and attitudes of the entities whose relations they
stabilize... It is the old conundrum of whether behavior should be inter-
preted as deviant or creative, precedent-shattering or precedent-establish-
ing. This is an inveterate problem of any legal system, but one particu-
larly onerous for a system lacking centralized and specialized institutions
for systenmtic clarification and revision of the 'law'." See also T. Tay-
lor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy 29 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Taylor]. The practice, however, should be in conformity with
shared legal expectations to be norm creating. See Lasswell & McDougal,
supra note 5, at 384, stating: "When decisions are controlling but not
authoritative, they are not law but naked power."
44See, t., 324T at 248; and United States v. List et al., 11 Trials
of War Criminals 757, 1248 (1948) [hereinafter referred to as T.W.C. and
United States v. List].
45Sc.e, e.g., I Oppenheim at 7.
46
The term "legislators" is used here in a general sense. The author
recognizes the lack of an international "legislature" as such, but disagrees
with any view that legislation in the general sense is lacking. The law
of war has a partial "source' In treaties, thoughpushing semantic dif-
ferences any further here would not be useful. Compare I.C.J. Stat. Art.
38, para. I, 1 Oppenheim at 27-29; and U.S. Dept. of Army, Law of Land
Warfare, para. 4 (Field Manual 27-10 1956) thereinafter cited as FM 27-
10] with Taylor at 29.
47Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (hereinafter referred
to as H.C. IVI. This convention has since grown to the status of being
cuqtomary international law (as recognized at Nuremberg) and some of the
actual text has been expanded or generalized into broad principles of
law. See FM 27-10, para. 6.
On the other hand, the High Contracting PaiLies
clearly do not intend that unforeseen cases should,
in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to
the arbitrary judgment of military commanders.
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has
been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it ex-
pedient to declare that, in cases not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule
of the principles of the law of nations, as they re-
sult from the usages established amnong civilized peo-
ples, from the laws of humaniU, and from the dicta-
tes of the public conscience.
Similarly, the 1949 Geneva Conventions contain an expression which re-
*cognizes the existence of normative precepts which are not as readily
identifiable as those of the Conventions but which are still of bind-
.Ing validity. The Conventions state that the parties to the armed con-
flict "shall remain bound to fulfil" obligations created "by virtue of
the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages es-
tablished among civilized peoples from the laws of humanity and the dic-
tates of the public conscience." And in The Paquete Habana, the United
States Supreme Court made the relevant and often quoted statement that:
48H. C. IV, preamble (this is klown as the Martens clause and was
named after the Russian jurist, Fedor Martens).
4 9See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civi-
lian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, Art. 158 (1956), 6 U.S.T.
3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365; 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter referred to as the
1949 Geneva Civilian Convention]. These conventions have not been de-
clared to be customary international law and binding on nonsignatories
(except so far as common article 3 provides), yet the fact that almost
every nation in the world has signed them is of some importance (per-
haps of more importance to the minority of scholars who believe that
obligations only arise from the express consent of a nation). These
are, perhaps, the most widely tatified treaties in existence outside
of the United Nations Charter itself.
Iie-knational law is part of our law, an must be
ascer-t ned and adiinistered by the courts of justice
of approprit'e jurisdiction as often as questions of
right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination. For this purpose, where there is no
treaty and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evi-
dence of these, to the works of jurists and comnenta-
tore who, by years of labor, research, and experience
have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with
the subjects of which they treat. Such works are re-
sorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the specula-
tions of their authors concerning what the law ought
to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law
really Is.
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Recognizing the need for evidence of what the law really is (especially
when law might be imperfectly expressed, not expresslycover all situa-
tions, or miLht have changed), we might seriously consider the need for
a system of law implementation which will approximate uniformity and con-
tinuous up-to-date expression of community expectations and demands in.
the area of the law of armed conflict.
Professors McDougal and Lasswell and their associates have viewed
Internationallaw as a type of "value-oriented jurisprudence," which has
"the listinctive orientation" in "the jurisprudence of human dignity."
Because of mutual affectation and other common interests, the syndrome
of parochialism is not the focus, but rather:
[t]he value goal is universal in scope, and evalua-
tes the institutions of any .time and place according
to the criterion of general, not narrow, participa-
tion in the shaping and sharing of the values yielded
by man's life in society. Within the reference frame
provided by this objective it is incumbent upon the
scholar or the decision-maker to locate himself in
the moving context of past, present, and future events
.[so as to] foster ty eventual emergence of a pub-
lic order of free men.:
50The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also I.C.J. Scat.
art. 38, para. 1. For a similar British practice, see Triquet v. Bath, 3
Burr, 1478, 96 Eng. Rep. 273 (K.B. 1764) before Lord Mansfield on the Kings
Bench.
5 McDougal t Fclicisno, Introduction by Professor Lasswell, at xix-
xx, and xxi.
Many agree that the value goal must be universal, that the decision-maker
and actor must consider and conform to the universal policy or goal values,
and that application of the law of war must be devoid of soecial interest
dominance or mutilation. But ho; is one able to identify changing expec-
tations, to choose from competing claims in conformity with expectations
which are generally shared, to receive authoritative community guidance
or suggestion relevant to conduct, to seek conforming response from ocher
parties to the conflict, and to guard against one's own excesses? How
can human goal values be implemented and effectively supervised in a sys-
tem where each state is left to interpret and apply the international
norms on its own?
Encumbering State Sovereignty
The international "system" for norm implementation that we presently
have is one in which the state itself predominates. It is often that hu-
nan values have been compromised or flatly rejected through deplorable
self-protective practices of "sovereign" state elites, and, at that,
through an often myopic view of national or elite self-interests. This
is not likely to change overnight, and the situation has !een described
as being quite predictable when law implementation is left primarily to
the discretion of each state (and, thus, to the state officials) absent
any international system for greater coumunity expression and guidance.
As Mr. William Korey has remarked:
The responsibility of government officials, after
all, is first and foremost the protection and pro-
motion of their own state's national interest. The
promotion and protection of the rights of citizens
of other countries have little relevance to this
aim. Moreover, many officials consider human rights
to be a dangerous Pandora's box. If it were opened,
no government would be safe from attack. Thus it
is the better part of valor to keep the lid closed
lest one's own shortcomings be exposed, marring the
image a government is attempting to project.
52
No government, it seems, wants to be the implementor (invoker) if its own
activities are also subject to condemnation or if it seeks some advantage
52
5 Korey, C.E.I.P,, The Key to Human Rights--Implementation 66 (Nov.
1968).
from the offending government. Few governmental elites have even attemp-
ted to regulate themselves or to prosecute violators of tne law of war
within their jurisdiction. The result has often been that state elites
are reluctant to condemn or to guard each other against future excesses,
and the individual is left without protection or even a voice in matters
which affect him directly--maters which the law is designed to cover in
his interest.53 Indeed, the Geneva norms have been considered to be per-
emptory or "absolute obligations" which are owing to all mankind rather
than towards particular state parties, and y t there is no real effort
at a broader inclusivity in implementation.
5 4
The intervening and encumbering state "sovereignty" in this area
of human concern has resulted in the lack of effective law implementing
machinery for normative promotion, prescription, and supervision; and
it has further resulted in continuing patterns of value frustration with
only intermitent, ad hoc community response. So intermitent apparently
that sotae who seem unaware of the pervading manifestations of co=munity
expectation concerning the limits of human suffering and the fundamental
rights of man have even denied the existence of law when law was not en-
forced in all cases by state elites. 5
5 This alone points to the need for
53Korey, C.E.I.P., supra note 52, at 66-67. See also id. at 68-69,
concerning the practice of states in this area (esp. the Greek and Haiti
events). States are reluctant to condemn on such general matters without
an orgarizational framework for proper inquiry. Perhaps they will con-
tinue to react in a similar manner in an organization to implement the
1949 Geneva Conventions, but it seems that some inquiry is more likely
when an organizational framework is provided for a consensus and the
state-sovereign votes on the matter can somewhat hide inside a majority
vote.
54
See, e.g., U.N. S.G. Report, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Con-
flicts, 24 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/77ZO (20 Nov. 1969), at 31 (agenda item
61), citing U.N. Report on the Lay of Treaties, 11 Ybk of Int'l L. Comm.
54 (1957). See also, U.N. Charter, arts. 55(c) and 56, and common arti-
cle 1 of the 1949-Geneva ConventiooS.
55One such author seems to be the 18th Century Van Bynkershoek, A
Treatise On the Law of War (Du Ponceau, trans. 1810) stating, at 2-3,
that every force is lawful in war including the death of defenceless peo-
ple except perfidy, and that 'generoclty is altogether a voluntary act."
This voice seems revived in the pre-VZUII German Lawbook on Landwarfare:
"By steeping himself in military history the officer will be able to
guard himself against excessive humanitarian notions," cited at Colby,
War Crimes, suxa note 1, at 509. One would agree with the positiviot
oriented Van Bynkershoek that law must reflect reality, but it seems to
the rr2sent author that reality includes the identifiable human pronounce-
ments and beliefs which must be analyzed along with practice to decide if
new international machinery in the area of human rights in time of arnied
conflict for the coordination of sanction strategy, but we will also fo-
cus on the present systems which could be utilized for Geneva Convention
implementation and, then, seek to identify some of the present system
shortcomings or the system barriers to effective law implementing machi-
nery. We should keep in mind that the goals are primarily to identify
community goal values (legal policy), to implement these values into prac-
tice, to provide guidance and protection, and to supervise action.
56
The Present System for Law Effectiveness
1. Under the Geneva Convertions: States, Protecting Powers, and the IRC
Today the "system" outlined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions for law
development, implementation, and supervision is an inadequate combina-
tion of state obligations and protecting power functions which represen-
ted, perhaps, the maximum consensus possible in 1949 but which seems out
of line with present expectation and a cooperative consensus which the
author believes to be presently possible.
there were legal expectations which were admittedly not always fulfilled.
Furtherrore, we should not ever conclude in a simplistic way that the ex-
tent of law is to be measured in the extent of "enforcement" when it is
recognized that law does exist. Public expectations can today have as
much or more of an effect on the positive oriented decision-maker as
past political practice, and law is multifarious in nature. It should
be noted that state duties to enforce the law were early recognized.
See 2 Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis 253 (C.E.I.P. ed., Kelsey trans.
1925); E. de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, Ou Principles de la Loi Naturelle
'163 (C.E.I.P. ed., Fenwick trans. 1916); Q. Wright, "The Law of the Nurem-
berg Trial," 41 Am. J. Int'l L. 38, 59, n. 74 (1947), stating: "If an
interest is 'protected by international law' every state is obligated by
international law not to authorize, and to take due diligence within its
jurisdiction to prevent, acts which would violate that interest."
56Primary goals preferred here are: (a) the establishment of common
responsibility adequate enough to secure minimum order and to mitigate
the destruction of values, and (b) the establishment of common respon-
sibility for the creative fostering of an optimum order of human dignity.
See also McDougal & Feliciano at vii, ix and 95-96; and McDougal, Lass-
well & Chen, "Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for Po-
licy-Oriented Inquiry," 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 237, 264-269 (1969).
State sovereignty was the backbone and inhibitor of any sort of achi-
evement which was possible in 1907 with the development of the present
Hague Conventions on the law of warfare; and in 1949 this was changed on-
ly slightly. Some efforts were made to "guarantee" enforcement of the
Geneva law through agreed procedure and state (party) duties, and it can-
not be doubted that these efforts represenced an important breakthrough.
Of the many duties relevant to law effectiveness found today in the Ge-
neva Conventions, the most significant are the obligations:
(1) to enact domestic legislation for the punishment of grave brea-
ches of the Convexitions,
57
(2) to disseminate the texts of the Conventions and to educate troops
and other citizens concerning the principles of the Conventions,
5o
(3) to communicate with other parties concerning translations and
laws or regulations adopted for implementation of the Conventions,
59
(4) to "ensure respect" for the Conventions "in all circumstances,"
60
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57See, e., G.C., art. 146 (the punitive or corrective sanction ob-
jective). See also Paust, "Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident: A Re-
sponse to Professor Rubin," 50 Ore L. Rev. 138, 149-152 (1971), reprinted
in 3 The Vietnam War and the International Law 359 (R. Falk, ed., 1972);
and "aust, "After My Lai: The Case for War Crime Jurisdiction Over Ci-
vilians in Federal District Courts," 50 Tex. L. Rev. 6 (1971), reprinted
in 4 The Vietnam War and International Law (1974). A related extensive
consideration of this and other prosecution requirements plus an exten-
sive documentation of U.N. trends in decision on this matter is inJ. Paust
& A. Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: A Case Study of
Bangladesh (1974).
58See, rP.., G. C., art. 144 (the educational requirement--intelli-
.gence function); and 4 J. Pictet, Commentary, Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 580-58 (1958) [here-
inafter cited as 4 Pictet].
.59See, e.g., Geneva Civilian Convention, article 145 (the communica-
tive, interpretative, and other functions); and 4 Pictet at 582-583.
60See, e.g., Geneva Civilian Convention article 1 (the cooperative,
Implementary, supervisory, and other functions); and 4 Pictet at 15-17.
This is the backbone of the implementary obligation and it is intercon-
nected with U.N. Charter, Arts. 55(c) and 56.
(5) to institute an inquiry into alleged violations when so re-
quested and in a manner agreed upon,61
(6) to repress any violation of the Conventions,
62
(7) to search for, arrest, and extradite or prosecute all persons
who have committed or ordered grave breaches of the Conventions,u
3
(8) to grant the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross)
certain visitation and investigatory privileges,
64
(9) to request or accept the services of a humanitarian organiza-
tion under certain circumstances,
65
(10) to allow a properly created Protecting Power or an alternative
entity to carry out its functions.
66
A more detailed consideration of the Protecting Power system reveals
a complexity of conditions that are imposed by the consenting "sovereigns"
which has led to the ineffectiveness of that particular system. In fact,
the system, as envisioned under the Conventions, has never been utilized
61 See_ e.g., Geneva Civilian Convention, article 149 (the investi-
gative function); and 4 Pictet at 603-606. Note that the enquiry pro-
cedure could take form in a state, protecting power, commission, or court,
etc., depending on the consent of the parties.
62 See, pe., Geneva Civilian Convention, articles 146 and 149 (the
punitive, control, supervisory, and other functions); and 4 Pictet at
593-594 and 606.
6 3See, e.a., Geneva Civilian Convention, article 146 (the punitive
and other functions); and 4 Pictet at 590-593.
64See, eg., Geneva Civilian Convention, article 143 (the visita-
tion, investigative, supervisory, humanitarian, and other functions);
and 4 Pictet at 579 (express agreement for ICRC visits).. See also Ge-
neva Civilian Convention, article 3 (ICRC may offer services in a con-
flict not of an international charactet), and articles 10 and 11 (pos-
sible roles of the ICRC in the Protecting Power, altenative, or humani-
tarian system capacities).
65See, e.g., Geneva Civilian Convention, article 11 (the humanitari-
an funcxton); and 4 Pictet at 99-113.
66 See, f._, G.C., arts. 9-12 and 143 (the protection and other func-
tions); and 4 PJctet at 93-112.
in its twenty four years of formal existence.6 7  The b.-kbone of mvlti-
lateral supervision was to be contain,,d in a Protecting Power that would
operate as an agent of a party to the conflict and as a somewhat impar-
tial agent of the other parties to the Conventions through a maze of du-
ties, conditions, and consensual arrangements.00 Once the Protecting Po-
wer comes into being, the parties have a duty to "cooperate" with it and
to facilitate its tasks, 69 which include the duty to scrutinize the Con-
ventions.70 The Protecting Power may also help by offering its "good of-
fices" for dispute settlement, and parties to the conflict are bound to
give effect to such an offer.'! Pictet calls this last aspect the "con-
ciliation procedure" (reconmendation)*and he states that, in such circum-
stances, the Protecting Power will try to achieve a "fair compromise re-
conciling the different points of view" and, in a sense, act as an agent
of all of the parties to the Convention.
72
67See U.N. S.G. Report A/7720, supra note 54, at 66. The ICRC has
had to perform as much of the contemplated role as it could and has been
performing humanitarian functions in about half of the conflicts that
have occurred since W. IT. See ibid.
68 See b't.and 4 Pictet at 86-92 (especially at 87 n.l). The 1949
Geneva Conventions expanded a traditional role of neutral states and
systematized a practice earlier established, under the same name(Pro-
tectlng Power).
*69See, e.g., Geneva Civilian Convention, Article 9.
70 See supra note 67.
71See, e ., Geneva Civilian Convention, article 12; and 4 Pictet at
113-117.
72See 4 Pictet at 113-117. See also Geneva Civilian Convention, ar-
ticle 149 (the inquiry procedure in case of an alleged violation of the
Conventions), and note that the Diplomatic Conference adopted a resolu-
tion recommending the use of the International Court of Justice when other
means'fail; 4 Pictet at 117. This was a noteable systems change from
the laquiry procedure contemplated under the 1899 Hague Conventions where-
by a Commission of inquiry would be established on an ad hoc basis to make
factual determinations and report them to the parties for furthex party
uegotiation; see Hague Convention for the Peaceful Adjustment of Inter-
national Differences, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, reprinted in 1 Am.
J. Int'l L. Supp. 107, 112-113 (1907).
The real difficulty with the Protecting Power system seems to con-
cern the ad hoc procedure for appointment of the entity and the inter-
related practical problems of achieving the necessary consent of the par-
ties once an armed conflict occurs. Not only must the Power of Origin
(the party whose persons are in the hands of the Detaining Power) con-
sent to ask a neutral power if it will represent it, but Zhe neutral po-
wer must itself consent to such an appointment as well as the enemy of
the Power of Origin (the Detaining Power). 73 This need for consent from
'at least threc different parties during even a relatively simple type
of armed conflict has been rightly criticized as an unworkable procedure
by eminant scholars. 74 And without the appointment of a Protecting Po-
wer all of the procedures and functional ability connected with that sys-
tem fail to operate--the result being an inexcusable failure of the opera-
tionalizing of community consensus through any mechanism in many cases.
It is true that the selection of a substitutive Protecting Power
was contemplated, but such a selection also rests on an ad hoc consen-
sual basis,75 and it fails to become operative due to sovereign inhibi-
tions. Although the Conventions also provide that a humanitarian organi-
zation must be allowed to function in case of a failure to agree on the
appointment of a Protecting Power or a substitute, the humanitarian or-
ganization is to serve only through "humanitarian functions" and not
through those additionally contemplated for the Protecting Power.76 This
alone points to the need for a permanent body created in advance of armed
73 See 4 Pictet at 87. This has been referred to as the tripartite
consensual basis which is necessary for the desired functioning of a
Protecting Power. These terms are from the Convention and are defined
in Pictet's Commentary.
74See, e g., paper delivered to the U.S. Army JAG School, Sept. 1971,
G.I.A.D. Draper, Collective and individual Responsibility for the Appli-
cation of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (Sept. 3, 1971). Profes-
sor Draper has also suggested the creation of an international protec-
ting power within, but "independent" of, the United Nations.
75See ibld. and Geneva Civilian Convention, article 11 plus 4 Pic-
tet at 107-108 and 110.
76See ibid, plus 4 Pictet at 109-11G. Pictet, id. at 109 states:
"The Detaining Power must request the intervention of a humanitarian or-
ganization. Moreover, should such an organization anticipate the De-
taining Power's request by spontaneously offering its services, the De-
taining Power must accept them," (or find another humanitarian organi-
violence through an agreement of the parties to the Conventions; and
since it cannot be known for sure who will be involved in armcd con-
flicts of the future, perhaps the functional capacities of a Protec-
ting Power should be mnlemented through either a permanent neutral body
or through a body involving all of the parties te the Conventions in
some form of constitutive assembly with subordinate working entities.
It should be noted that the ICRC, the hnanitarian organization
historically most concerned with these Conventions and most likely to
be acceptable to the parties to an armed conflict, is unable and un-
willing (and should not seek) to Jeopardize its ability to act by as-
suming the greater functions of a Protecting Power.77 Often, the Red
Cross must function in relative silence and make its plea and reports
only to deprivor regimes.78 This, of course, must be remembered in con-
zation, see id., next paragraph). Note that the ICPC would, in most ca-
ses, be the proper organization and tnat the ICRC enjoys certain visita-
tion prerogatives under Geneva Civilian Convention, article 143, in any
-event. (For a conflict not of an international nature, see common ar-
ticle 3; the Red Cross "may offer" its services in such d conflict).
See also GPW, Art. 126.
77See, e.., 4 Pictet at 102 and 109, stating that the ICRC could
not assume all of the responsibilities of a Protecting Power and remain
impartual and humanitarian in direction. And see 124 Int'l Rev. of the
Red Cross 411-412 (1971) (extracts from the Statutes of the ICRC re:
its functions as an independent, impartial, universal, nonpolitical, and
neutral organization). But note that the ICRC also assumes a role as
an improver and disseminator of law and recognizes a role under the Con-
ventions to seek application of the Conventions and "to take cognizance
of any complaints regarding alleged breaches" (ibid.). See also Freymond,
"The International Committee of the Red Cross Within the International
System," 133 Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross 245 (1972) and references ci-
ted; Gottlieb, "International Assistance to Civilian Populations in Ar-
ned Conflicts," 4 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L & Policy 403, 420-425 (1971) on the
functions of the ICR; and the U.N. S.G. Report A/7720, supra note 54,
at 66.
78See Freymond, supra note 77, at 249, stating that "the ICRC has
had no alternative. It cannot, as it is so often being asked to do,
protest publicly lest all doors be closed to it;" and Gottlieb, supra
note 77, at 420, stating that ICRC zctivity has hinged upon "silence
when silence was the price for doing anything at all." Apparently some
participants in the ICRC will push, at times, for a more open effort
of protest~as was the case in the October, 1973, Arab-Israeli War. See
sidering the functional interrelationship between a new supervisory or-
ganization and the ICRC or in considering the functional capacity of our
present "system" for Geneva Convention implementation. This does not
preclude an active and valuable ICRC role in the present or future con-
text nor within the framework of a new system. in fact, multiple func-
tional efforts may be desired, but the capacity of the ICRC does indi-
cate that it cannot assume the duties incumbent upon each party to the
Conventions to implement and ensure respect for the Conventions in all
circumstances.79 Those state obligaLions which perhaps entail the duty
to guard each other against excesses, especially common Article 1 in con-
junction with the U.N. Charter, cannot be pushed onto the ICRC in the
hope that the state itself can continue to avoid active involve:ent in
the ongoing regulation of Geneva law and human rights. Moreover, al-
though it is true that the ICRC, itself recognizing certain inadequacies
of past ICRC functioning and a greater potentail role in humanitarian
functioning, has been newly reorganized to allow greater local initia-
tive and even the pressuring of governmental elites through an expres-
sion of "the public's dissatisfaction with the conduct of nations" with
an occasional appeal to world public opinion,80 the ICRC cannot be called
upon to perform'all of the state obligations under the Geneva law and the
U.N. Charter, nor to provide the complete framework for a more effective
sanctioning process.
There are further difficulties and inadequacies with the present sys-
tem beyond the problem of consensus in the appointment of a Protecting
Power. Grave difficulties arise in getting the parties to an armed con-
flict to even admit that a conflict exists or to agree on the legal na-
ture of the conflict, the extent of Convention obligations, the types of
persons entitled to protection and methods of implementation.81 Further-
"Red Cross Happy at Mideast Steps," N. Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1973, at 6:1.
79See Gottlieb, supra note 77, at 422-426, suggesting that "dif-
ferent types of hu:anitarian concerns" are proper and necessnry where
complex political, military, economic, and social realities require a
multiplicity of humanitarian effort to gain as complete a coverage as
possible- Cf. id. at 427. Professor Gottlieb classified at least four
main types of humanitarian effort (neutral, revolutionary, moralistic,
and international). See also U.N. S.G. Report A/7720, supra note 54,
at 66-67.
80See "Red Cross Happy at Mideast Steps," supra note 78. See also
"Red Cross Urging Code on Civilians," N.Y.T., Oct. 12, 1973, at 18:3.
81See G.I.A.D. Draper, supra note 74; 11. Levie, When Battle Rages,
How Can Law Protect? (J. Carey ed. 1971) (working paper, 14th Hammarskjold
more, there exist logistical, physical and financial problems which tend
to preclude the effectiveness of an ad hoc system and 'hich additionally
point to the need for an international organization with defined func-
tional capacities and operational supporctA 2 Also important is the fact
that the Protecting Power "system" is unable to guarantee a universal
input of thought or to provide a human rights focus as opposed to tziat
of the sovereign elite system. So tangled are the roles which the Pro-
tecting Power is asked to play, that it seems likely that a conflict in
values will occur.8 3 Further criticism concerns the ad hoc nature of
the general system which will necessarily lead to imperfect action and
an inability to deal with long range goals and problems in Convention
implementation. Professor Draper's generalization, that absent a me-
chanism for the repular application of the supervisory functions all
further law-making (prescription) can have but little effect, is too
close to the truth. I lie adds that unless some effective mechanism for
the observance of human expectations is generated, the law itself might
Forum); 124 Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross 366 (1971); and 4 Pictet'at 115.
8 2 See 124 Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross 367 (1971) (duties of the Pro-
tecting Power are considerable and costly); and 4 Pictat at 8' and 89
(staffing, facility, transport, material, monetary, and other burdens
may be extremely heavy for one state to bear). See also Freymond, su-
pra note 77, at 258-259, for an analysis of logistical and other func-
tional problems faced by the ICRC in the past.
8 3 See 4 Pictet at 110, stating that the Protecting Power is "pri-
marily the agent of the Power of Origin, whose interests it safeguards,"
but that the Conventions also impose hunanitarian duties and obligations
to ensure input of universal values which may well conflict, in part,
with state interests.
84Draper, paper, ,_Epra note 74. Note that Professor Draper states
that it is not practical to rely on only one mechanism--there must be
available to belligerents a number of different methods with a body
such as the ICRC an a mandatory temporal solution in the humanitarian
functional area until one of the alternatives is finally agreed upon.
Of course, this would allow parties to reject other functional concerns.
someday fall into "total and cynical discredit", at least among the peo-
ple for whom the rules were created. Certainly the collective responsi-
bility of all parties to the Conventions to respect and ensure respect
f'r the law in all circumstances demands something more. And collective
responsibility can best be met, it seems, in a collective system whereby
all parties can and do participate. We desperately need a cooperative
effort in this area of human concern. The present system is ineffec-
tive for human needs and even for the implementing of present state obli-
gations which exist under the Conventions.
2. Report of the Secretary General: A View of Transition
A recent report of the U.N. Secretary General contains some valu-
able comment and insight into functional needs and system capacities.
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The shortcomings of the Protecting Power system are recognized and it
is suggested that a Protecting Power be made to represent the interests
of the community as a whole.86 It is stated that all efforts designed
to minimize the unnecessary suffering of human beings should be consi-
dered by the coiraunity in the development of new sanction strategy, but
certain comment which consistently appears in the Report implies that now
there is a preference for the creation of some form of international ma-
chinery for the application of the Geneva Conventions.
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The valuable role that the ICRC has performed in the pastand can
continue to performis also recognized; and it is emphasized that close
cooperat.on between the Red Cross and the United Nations organs is ue-
cessary. But it is known that the ICRC role lies in the exercise of hu-
manitarian functions and that other functions connected with an effec-
tive implementation and securing of Geneva law might be exercised by "in-
stitutionalizing, through United Nations organs or otherwise, other in-
ternational efforts, [e]specially in fields in which the International
85Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, 25 U.N. GAOR, U.N.
Doc. A/8052 (1970) (agenda item 47). This was the second report of such
a nature; the first report being made in the 24th Session (U.N. Doc. A/7720
[1969], supra note 54.).
861d. at 75. We have already discussed the difficulties and con-
flicting values connected with this approach.
87See id. at 76-79, and 6, 10-11, 19 (special cornissions in safLty
zones), 23-29 (the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property has a sys'em of party representation, a Coimni!sion-Gcneral, and
Committee cannot operate...."88 The preliminary report had noted the li-
mits placed upon the ICRC which arise not only from such problematic con-
cerns as whether the iCRC statezents will find acceptability among stares
as constituting an authoritative expression, but also from the tiaditions,
purposes, and character of the organization itself.89 It seemed a general
conclusion that the ICRC cannot solve all of the problems of Geneva Conven-
tion implementation by itself and that all nation-state signatories will
have to coordinate their contributive efforts through some mechanism.
The Secretary General also explored the possible role of the United
Nations and concluded, not surprisingly, that due to the nature of the
U.N. organization as the "most authentic and comprehensive expression of
the international community," a United Nations role would appear eminent-
ly justified.90 We will want to explore the functional capacities of chat
body before making a similar conclusion--the Secretary General's Report was
not self critical. It is recognized, however, that certainly some contri-
bution can be made by the United Nations entities as well as numerous 'GOs
such as the Internatipnal League for the Rights of Man, Amensty Interna-
tional, and so forth. J
The Secretary's Report noted the history of past involvement by the
United Nations in the area of human rights during armed conflict, but it
was admitted that past practice has been of an ad hoc nature and that it
would be most desirable to set up an "agency of implementation under the
other modalities worth exploring, 49-51, and 58.
8 8Id. at 11; see also id. at 49, and 76-79.
8 9Id. at 76. See also Freymond, su pra note 77; cf. su ra note 80.
90Id. at 77. The Report was not self critical. Recent practices
confirm this desire for a more active U.N. role. See, e.g., The Rights
of Man--Bull. of Int'l League For the Rights of Ian 6 (Nov. 1972), stat-
ing that the League "Joined with other NGOs in submitting a proposal to
establish a permanent U.N. body to investigate hu:nn rights complaints
arising from armed conflict and violations of the laws of war." For an
analysis of general human rights implementary capacites of the U.N., see
Sohn, "U.N. Machinery for Implementing H.R.," 62 Am. J. Int'l L. 909 (19-
68); and McDougal & Bebr, "Human Rights in the United Nations," 58 Am. J.
Int'l L. 603 (1964).
9191 See, international League for the Rights of Man, Immediate
Release-no. 74-960-1, charge of Syrian refusal to follow GPW (Jan. 4,
1974); and "Private Group Seeks to Protect Political Prisoners in Viet-
aegis of the United Nations."92 But, curiously, the Report concludes that
the organization should have the same attributes as those of the ICRC,(f.e.,
tLat it should be strictly humanitarian, scrupulously non-poitical, and
have all the guarantees of impartiality, efficiency, and rectitude); the
same unoffending attributes, it should be noted, which now preclude the
ICRC from functioning effectively in the certain areas of law implemen-
tation and supervision (or from taking over the state signatory obliga-
tions).
Perhaps it would be-better to have the ICRC maintain its functional
role instead of creating a duplicatory entity with the lack of power to
Lecome more effective and a lack of functional ability to fulfill the ri-
sing hopes which people might attribute to the entity upon its creation
(not having dreamed that some sovereign-elite conspiracy might have sought
only an unoffending farce). Perhaps, indeed, it would be better to allow
the states to express themselves directly for a consensus formation of
some worth or, in other words, perhaps we need to create a body which is
highly political, involved and able to formulate consensus expressions
in an authoritative manner.9 3 In fact, how can an organization provide
authoritative guidance without being somewhat political when the relevant
law must deal with human beings at their moments of greatest stress and
conflict? If by impartiality the Secretary General means that the or-
ganization should remain inoffensive or neutral, he would be asking the
entity to refrain from active implementary involvciaent (or to cut back
on its sanction accivity as well as its general intelligence, promotioLi,
invocation, and application functioning). However, if by impartiality
nam," N. Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1972.
9 2 S. G. Report, supra note 85.
9 3 For some support of the view that international organizational
functioning and legal efficacy are necessarily partially reliant up-
on "political forces" in context, see I. Claude, Swords Into Plowshares
(3 ed. 1964). We note that politics is not to be feared but under-
stood if one is interested in viable law or institutions since the le-
gal and political processes are contextually intertwined.
(in the neutral, noninvolvement or inoffensive sense) is fine for some
humnitarian functions, but it isn't worth a dPmn if the purpose is to
stop a state or group from moving outsida the boundaries of a shared ex-
pectation. A demonstratcd consensus within an authoritative structure
could do much more than unoffending impartiality. Indeed, this seems
to have been explicitly recognized by ICRC leaders that seek to provide
an even more active ICRC effort to utilize the important sanction of pub-
lic opinion. Furthermore, an "impartial" iegal consensus and "autono-
mous" guidance functions, as advocated by the U.N. report, could still
find roan in an international structure which has a modality for poli-
tical consensus as well as a consensus of "impartial" experts.9 4 This
"legislative" body and the expert advisory council could be supplemen-
ted with other structures for a more useful coordinate sanctioning of
Geneva law.
We should recall, however, that complete impartiality (in both sen-
ses considered here) is a myth and the quest for it is no panacea to im-
plementary problems. In fact, it is often given as an excuse for involve-
ment or state elite inaction when cooperative activity is not only called
for by the United Nations Charter and conmon Article 1 of the Geneva Con-
ventions but is also needed to assure the efficacy of law in actual pat-
terns of operation. In this sense it, can be contextually unrealistic
to hide behind the myth of impartiality with a claim that the law might
then be better implemented in practice. Furthermore, there have been
serious doubts in the past as to whether any participant can be "impar-
tial," ana we should recall the Soviet attitudinal inhibitions toward an
expanded role for "neutral" men (e.g., the Secretary General) or co-r-.is-
sioned groups (e.g., ONUC during the Congo crisis). 9 5 Recent Israeli con-
demnation of the U.N. entity investigations of alleged Geneva law viola-
tions reiterates these points and it helps to support the viewpoint that
"impartiality" should not be sought after as much as an inclusivity of
varied perspectives s3 as to assure an aggregate "partiality" and a co-
operative contnensus (the shared expectations and demands of the commu-
nity rather thian a continuation of the myth (which is now being challenged)
9 4 Concerning alternative or supplemental modalities within the same
general structure, ae S.G. Report, supra note 85, at 79, where there is
noticed a pos,;Ible role for an executive head (High Commissioner) and a
committee of IC.al experts. These two bodies could participate within
the same new organiration or within the complexities of the United Nations
system. In All fa!rness it should be noted that the consensus functioning
would take pl!-co In the General Assembly; but even then there are problems
worth exploring. see text Infra.
9 5 e, ' Claude, 22pra note 93, at 301.
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of organizational impartia1ity. This last view also sc.ves the pre-
ferred goal of a wide participation in the process of international de-
cision-making and repudiates appeasement and indifference, which are ot-
ten aligned with an "impartiality" stance, as being ultimately more con-
ducive to a world of disorder and human indignity.Agaln, rules cani.ot
protect us from ourselves and it seems that an inclusive effort at guard-
ing each other against our own excesses is the best approach.
The Secretary General's Report also mentioned the possible role
of the United Nations .agencies in a continued concern for law effective-
ness. There are recognitions of the possible contributions of the Uni-
ted Nations Commission on Human Rights; the creation of special committees
to study specified problems; the role of a new Human Rights Comittee
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Optional Protocol; the more traditional roles of the General Assembly,
the Secretary General, the Security Council, and the Economic and So-
cial Couiicil; and the precedent roles of UNESCO under the regulations
annexed to the 1954 Hague Convention f3r the Protection of Cultural
Property.97 The Report states:
Already, fact-finding functions relating to the ap-
plication of the provisions of some of the Geneva
Conventions have been included in the terms of re-
ference of ad hoc bodies established by the General
Assembly and the Commission of Human Rights with the
approval of the Economic and Social Council.98
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96For evidence of the Israeli condemnation of U.N. investigatory ef-
forts, see, e.g., Greenspan, "Human Rights in the Territories Occupied by
Israel," 12 Santa Clara Lawyer 377 (1972); and 2 Israel Ybk. on H.R. 154
(1972), also emphasizing the need for a more inclusive, authoritative
fact authenticating process.
97For the UNESCO role, see S.G. Report, supra note 85, at 23-29.
Note that the parties to a conflict must still appoint their own re-
presentatives and a Commissioner General on an ad hoc basis, though
the system described does have an operational experience in a recent
armed conflict. Id. at 27.
98Id. at 77. See also id. at 1i0, concerning the creation of a
Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human
Rights of the Population of Occupied Territories (G.A. Res. 2443 [XCIII]
[1968]), and the 1969 action of the Human Rights Com.ission through the
establishment of a special investigatory group concerning Israeli viola-
No doubt these roles are helpful and the training and education
programs under UNESCO or UNITAR are most important, but the Report it-
self recognizes a further need for an agency of implementation which
functions on a "durable standing basis" with specialized expertise.99
Moreover, the recent denial of the use of the UNESCO headquarters in Paris
for a conference on the abolition of torture sponsored by Amnesty Inter-
national points out the need for an active implementary organization which
is able to function outside of the normal U.N. structural maze and the
general ineptitude of organizations with an "impartial" stance on matters.
of hurnRnitarian (indeed, human) concern. Although kr.esty International
had a contract for the use of the UNESCO facilities, permission was denied
under a "general rule" that organizations utilizing such facilities re-
fraiii from criticizing member states or "use material offensive to any
member state."100 Well, one can just about predict the trend in UNESCO
or other U.N. entity decision with such a broad and unoffending stance.
And it is inadequate.
3. The United Nations Framework: Competence and Conditioning Factors.
Here we will briefly explore the general framework of the United Na-
tions as previously constituted and presently developing, and we will
identify some of its present imperfections and less than satsifactory
trends concerning the implementation of the Geneva Conventions (recog-
nizing that a special U.N. Commission could be created in the future
which mignt overcome some of the present difficulties). A look at the
U.N. Charter reveals the formalized expectations concerning the alloca-
tion of competence and also an :uthroitative basis for an active United
tions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. A most valuable exploration of
the U.N. role in the investigation of Soutb African violations of hu-
man rights can be found in J. Carey, UN Protection of Civil and Poli-
tical Rights 95-126 (1970).
99For a recent critical analysis of the U.N. entity reporting sys-
tems, trends in decision and the general predispositional inhibitions
to effective human rights implementation which permeate present U.N.
system entities, see J. Humphrey, "Human Rights and World Law," work
paper, Abidjan World Conference on World Peace Through Law (Aug. 1973),
at 6-7, passim.
100See "U.N. Unit Drops Supiort of Conference on Torture," N.Y.T.,
Dec. 4, 1973, at 2, col. 4.
ted Nations role.101 The preamble of the Charter expresse. a shared de-
termination of the peoples of the United Nations "to reaffirm faith in
fumdamental human rights" and "the dignity and worth of the human per-
son" and to "establish conditions under which justice and respect" for
international obligations can be maintained.10- Tn tne following anauly-
sis it is assumed that these shared determinations are still supported
by the international community and, indeed, due to the increase in U.N.
membership over the years and the dynamic nature of the document it is
argued that no contrary assumption should be considered.
Article 1(3) of the Charter declares~as a major purpose of the Uni-
ted Nations) the effort to achieve international cooneration in solving
problems of a humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Article 2(4) reveals
an expectancy of obligation on the part of members to refrain from the
threat or use of force which is inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations (e.g., force which is inconsistent with the purpose, ar-
ticulated in Articles 1, 55(c) and 56, to achieve respect for human rights-
in other words, force which constitutes a denial of human rights in time
of armed conflict as well as human rights in general).103 Article 55(c)
101Se, Secretary General Report, supra note 54, at 109-110, stating:
"Under the Charter of the United Nations the Organization has the autho-
rity to establish the international organs required for the purpose, in-
ter alia, of promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms for all and for fulfilling the pledge of all members
to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization...."
102U.N. Charter, preamble.
103It seems clear that the use of force by a member in its "inter-
national relations" which denies or violates human rights would consti-
tute a violation of the Charter, Article 2(4), and allow appropriate Or-
ganizational response. See, e.g., McDougal & Feliciano at 177-179 for
an apt analysis of Article 2(4); J. Paust&A. Blaustein, supra note 57;
and Paust & Blaustein, "The Arab Oil Weapon: A Threat to International
Peace," 6b Am. J. Int'l L. 410 (1974). This is an important point which
is little emphasized by others. Note that Article 2(7) should not pre-
clude action in this connectionsince violations of Geneva law are al-
ready known to constitute war crimes and are matters of international con-
cern. See, 9_., 2 Oppenheim at 567 n. 2(11). In this connection it
should be noted that Professors McDougal and Reisman have stated that,
"...in the contemporary world, international peace and security and the
protection of human rights are inescapably interdependent and that the
impact of the flagrant deprivation of the most basic human rights of
declares that the United Nations shall promote "uniersal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for alL.."; ± 0 4
and in Article 56 all members have pledged to "tahe Joint and separate
action in cooperation with the Organiz.tion" (emphosis added) for the
achievement of such purposes. 0 1 Certainly these Charter powers and
member duties constitute an authoritative basis for possible United Na-
tions participation in an effort to supervise and coordinate the guaran-
tees of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and, more specifically, for the cxea-
tion of a subsidiary organ to encourage, promote, and supervise the Lmple-
mentation of Geneva precepts during armed conflict through cooperative
international action.
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Present functional capacities in this area are not detailed in the
Charter but a general view of the structure of the U.N. would help in an
understanding of possible future roles or potential operational ability.
One should remember, however, that by assigning close supervisional func-
tions concerning the 1949 Geneva Conventions to the general U.N. struc-
ture, one could preclude the desired effectiveness, since the specialized
functional aspects and concerns of Geneva law implementation could be
dissipated in the maze of greater problems which the U.N. structure must
now face (e.g., the broader problems and the significantly more "politi-
cal" concerns involving state recognition, state membership in the U.N.,
state "aggression", state "intervention", and so forth).1 0 ' A recent ex-
ample of U.N. functional inability in this regard (beyond a post hoc emer-
the greatest mass of the people nf a community cannot possibly stop short
within the territorial boundaries in which the physical manifestations
of such deprivations first occur." McDougal & Reisman, "Rhodesia and
the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern," 62 Am. J.
Int'l L. 1, 18 (1968).
104Note that Article 60 declares that the responsibility for the
discharge of the organizational functions in promoting respect for and
observance of human rights rests with the General Assembly, though the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) also has powers in this area.
105This member pledge is similar to common Article I of the Geneva
Conventions. Note that separate action is also pledged--presumably in
order to assure some action in the event of organizational ineffective-
ness.
106See, supra note 104; and U.N. Charter, Art. 22.
107See also U.N. S.C. Report, supra note 54, at 11; "U.N. Rights
Group Is Under Attack," N.Y.T., Mar. 10, 1974, at 1, col. 1; letter,
gency relief coordination effort) occurred during the violont emergence
of the new state of Bangladesh.108 As Marc Schreiber has correctly poin-
ted out, the United Nations "was established to prevent international
wars and not to regulate the manner in which wars would be conducted."1 0 9
Although this is too simplistic, today it seems that the fimctional direc-
tion must still primarily concern conflict managmnent questions in the
broad sense; and these might well require a different and interfering
focus, balance, or sanctioning effort, and might ultimately preclude a
continuous and effective regulation of the more particularized law of the
Geneva Conventions through the general U.N. structure. Even if a speciali-
zed agency is created,-the overriding purposes and politics of the general
organizational entities (the U.N. primary organs) may preclude effective
Geneva law implementation and supervision due to higher entity concerns
or drawbacks (though this does not necessarily have to be the case).1 1 0
Higher entity concerns and pervasive political differences on the "larger"
questions seem to have played a key role in the imperfect attempts to im-
plement the Geneva Conventions through U.N. entities in 1967 and more re-
cently in the Mideast and also in Vietnam and Bangladesh.
The present operational ability of the general U.N. structure to re-
spond to implenentary needs seems to be tied to the allocated competence
of the General Assembly. The General Assembly has the power to discuss
any questions or matters within the scope of the Charter and to make re-
1 0 8For a survey of the U.N. emergcncy relief role in the Indian, Ban-
gladesh, Pakistan crisis, see Gottlieb, "The United Nations and Emergency
Humanitarian Assistance in India, Pakistan," 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 362-365
(1972). The lack of any vital U.N. role in the protection of human rights
during the Vietnamese conflict is a matter of common knowledge and regret;
in both of these recent conflicts the ICRC has been far more active and
effective (except in North Vietnam). See also Freymond, supra note 77.
1 0 9Statement of Mr. Marc Schreiber, Director, Secretariat Human Rights
Division, U.N., at the 14th 1ammarskjold Forum, March 16, 1970, When Battle
Rages, How Can Law Protect? 54 (J. Carey ed. 1971). See also Freymond, su-
pra note 77, at 248, stating that in the past the ICRC was able to act "at
a time when the United Nations was not in a position to act;" and Petrow-
ski, Law a,.d the Conduct of the Vietnam War, 2 The Vietnam War and Int'l
Law 439, 455, and 457-58 (1969). For a more detailed insight into trends
and policies connected with U.N. efforts to manage the overriding problems
of armed conflict, see Claude, supra note 93.
11One should not throw the new international organization into the
U.N. 6tructural maze merely for the sake of bureaucratic convenience, es-
pecially if independence would allow a more effective functioning and not
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commendations in certain cases. Of course, these would not concern
the day to day Geneva impiementation requirements since there are time
and other considerations which would preclude General Assembly abiliLy
to respond to continuous and more particularized needs. The General As-
sembly also has a duty to initiate studies and inmake recorrendations to
encourage the progressive development of international law and its codi-
fication (usually handled in the Sixth Cozmittee).i12 This is a most im-
portant function, but an examination of the International Law Corission
activities discloses that work often proceeds for several years and that
the outcomes are of a relatively general nature (i.e., not conducive to
particularized guidance functions which are necessary for Geneva law im-
plementation). The General Assembly shall also initiate stuMes and make
recomendations to assist in the realization of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms.113 Under this power, the General Assembly has recently re-
quested the aid of the Secretariatand the Secretary General complied with
two reports on the respect for human rights in time of armed conflict.
Curiously, the General Assembly also authorized the Secretary General
to "take all other necessary steps to give effect to the provisions of
the present resolution," which affirmed three principles of law (already
identifiable in customary international law) and called pon states to
join certain conventions of the law of armed conflict.114 No one has
entirely preclude U.N. assistance. However, a counterpoint would con-
cern the already existant broad framework which might be an aid t7 the
new organ.
I1 U.N. Charter, Article 10.
1 12U.N. Charter, Article 13(1).
11 3U.N. Charter, Article 13(2).
114 G.A. Res. 244A, Respect for human rights in armed conflicts, 23
U.N. CAOR, Supp. 18, .c 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218(1969) (unanimously affirm-
ing the 20th !CRC Conference at Vienna (1965) Resolution XXVIII).
yet suggested that this action authorized the Secretary Geneual to super-
vise the application of these three principles in a manner usually con-
templated for a U.N. subsidiary organization, but the language authori-
zing "all other necessary steps to 4.ive effect" seems to be broad and an
important delegation of authority.'-I We would have to await, however,
further Secretariat action under this clause to test acceptability of
the action by reference to responding demands and expectations--there
are no other indicia of such a broad delegation of implementary authority
known to the author.
The General Assembly also has the organizational responsibility for
the promotion of respect and observance of human rights and for the co-
ordinatiun of the cooperative efforts of members and specialized agencies
(such as UNESCO and the ILO) in that endeavor.1 6 And in the exercise of
the above functions the General Assembly can create a subsidiary organ to
give specialized attention to the problems connected with Geneva law ef-
fectiveness,1 1 7 while also utilizing another subsidiary body (the Inter-
national Lav, Comission) for the progressive development and interpreta-
tion of Geneva law. Note also that shoull Geneva law violations (because
of the number of participants, impacts, and so forth) become of such mag-
nitude that they affect international "peace", "security", "friendly re-
115Note that the Secretary General has offered his services in prior
conflict settlements and has also coordinated certain advisory services
for governments in the field of human rights. See U.N., Everyman's Uni-
ted Nations--A Five Year Supplement 158-159 (1971).
116See U.N. Charter, Articles 55(c), 56, 58, and 60. Note that the
ECOSOC has such power while operating "under the authority of the Gener-
al Assembly." U.N. Charter, Art. 60. See also U.N. Charter, Art. 71;
the ECOSOC may contribute as well by coordination with non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) such as the ICRC. For an analysis of advisory and
promotion practices by the U.N. structure see U.N. S.G. Report, Advisory
Services in the Field of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/995, E/CN.6/
522 (1969).
117U.N. Charter, Article 22. Such an organ could apparently have
the power to study situations, investigate matters, and report or make
recommendations to the General Assembly (most of the fact finding func-
tions). See Goodrich & H1ambro, Charter of the United Nations 193-197
(rev. ed. 1949).
lations", or the "general welfare" (as those norm categories or dynamic,
key legal terms are interpreted), the General Assembly can engage in re-
levant discussion, make appropriate reconendations, and in some cases,
even take action tinder the precedent of the Uniting for Peace Resolution
(if the unusual circumstances for a consensus and Security Council in-
action exist).11
Of eoursn the early view that the General AsseTHY was to "discuss,
consider, a:a ao reconend, but not to take action" seems to outline
present functional expectation, and it is still primarily a Security Coun-
cil functioi.to take appropriate action with respect to the higher level
"threats to *Ko peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression."'2 0
The Security Council could also play important roles in an investigatory
capacity,12 by making recoimendations for appropriate procedures or meth- .
ods of adjustment (including the use of the International Court of Justice),"-
'1 See U.N. Charter, Articles 10, II, and 14; and G.A. Res. 337A,
Uniting for Peace, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 20, at 10-12, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950) (involving the possible use of force "to maintain or restore in-
ternational peace and security"). Rarely, it seems (and we hope), will
violations of the Geneva Conventions pr se be of such a magnitude as
to meet the standard for operationalizing these powers.
Goodrich & Hambro, supra nnte 117, at 150.
120U.N. Charter, Articles 39-51; and see Articles 12(l) and 24(1).
See J. Carey, supra note 54, at 25 for a view of the problems connected
with the Security Council use of the Chapter VI1 measures for the pro-
tection of human rights.
121U.N. Charter, Article 34. See also U.N. S.C. Report A/7720, su-
pra note 54, at 10-11.
122U.N. Charter, Articles 36 and 38. See also Article 94(2), con-
cerning enforcement of the judicial decision. J. Carey, supra note 98,
at 51 states that "no instance is found where the Security Council, strict-
ly speaking, has been asked to secure compliance with a judgment....' and
that "UN help in enforcing judgments, whether through the Security Coun-
cil or the General Assembly, remains untested." It should also be noted
that the United States Reservation Lo ICJ jurisdiction operates in con-
nection with multilateral treaties such as the Geneva Conventions.
or in the establishment of subsidiary organizations. 123 But, as with
the General Assembly, it seems that the Security Council interests are
at too high a level for a continuous and effective supervision of Gene-
va law and something which is capable of responding directly to all of
the Convention implementary needs should be created.
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) certainly has a general
supervisory role to play as outlined in the Charter. This includes the
ability to make or initiate studies and reports and to make recommenda-
tions to the General Assembly, specialized agencies or members (Articles
62[l] and [2]); to draft conventions for submission to the General As-
sembly (Article 62[3]); to coordinate with specialized agencies and non-
governmental organizations (Articles 63 and 71); to receive member and
specialized agency reports (Article 64); to perform functions assigned
or approved by the General Assembly (Article 66); and to set up commis-
sions for the promotion of human rights (Article 68; ., the Human
Rights Commission). But these important functions do not allow a de-
tailed and direct Geneva law implementary role except through the work-
ings of a specialized commission under Article 68 (which is probably the
best way of putting a Geneva Convention supervisory body directly into
the U.N. structure if such is desired).
12
Perhaps even the creation of a commission to operate within the U.N.
structure is not an adequate means of assuring that all of the Convention
implementary needs are met.125 For example, there are problems of delay
123U.N. Charter, Article 29.
124Note that a separate organization can be "brought into relation-
ship with the United Nations" under _rticles 57(1) and 63, apparently
even to such an extent that Geneva organization recommendations may be
transmitted through the ECOSOC to the General Assembly for appropriate
U.N. action. Such U.N. action may even include the use of the Interna-
tional Court.
125This would also apply to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
This particular commission may have too broad a perspective to deal ef-
fectively with the Geneva Conventions on a day to day basis.
and approval of commission action by higher U.N. entities, there Pre pro-
blems of commission inability to make authoritative treaty interpreta-
tions, and other problems exist concerning decisional and coordination
functions which might best be met in a separate organization c=pos-d of
all of the treaty signatories. And a more independent organization could
focus the power of consensus onto specific problems in a direct manner ra-
ther than through the general U.N. structure where a fog of other problems
and values may dissipate the specified focus on Geneva law.
A brief focus on the Human Rights Commission can illustrate ceitain
inadequacies of a commission which functions within the general structure.
Soon after it was created, the Human Rights Commission disclosed a func-
tional incapacity which seems little changed through Vietnam and Bangla-
desh. It stated that it recognized "that it has no power 9g take any ac-
tion in regard to any complaints concerning human rights." 26  The United
Nations structure offers certain advantages but entities within it often
have a tenuous functional existence which seems too interconnected with
general structure politics. Not only did the Human Rights Commission
have to recognize that fact when it was created, but it seems that it
chose not to press for more power as an entity until a lapse of some
twenty years when General Assembly "assaults on colonialism and South
African apartheid" proved of some benefit for an expansion of commission
capacity into, at least, the investigatory functional area. 127 Even to-
day, the Commission is just beginning to utilize its Investigatory func-
tions1 28 and it does not seem capable of pressing for the use of other
- functional pnwers. Furthermore, subsidiary entities, such as the Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of DiscriminatiQq9 and Protection of Minori-
ties, have experienced similar incpacities;l and although an Ad H!oc
Working Group of Experts was created by the Commission in 1967 to per-
form investigative functions which have been gradually expanded, it seems
that the Ad Hoc Working Group is not the type of institutional response
126This statement was approved by the ECOSOC in Res. 75(V)(1947),
quoted in J. Carey, suora note 98, at 96 n. 8.
127See id. at 96, and at 90-91. Carey also states that the U.N.
lagged behind European and Inter-Amarican regional efforts at human rights
effectiveness, and that the 'outbreak of human rights investigation" from
1967 to 1969 by the Commission was a novel development.
128See id. at vii and viii (statement of Mr. Korey), at 125 (state-
ment of Professor Jankovic), and at 90-91. See also supra note 107.
1291d. at 85-87. See also the more recent condemnation, Humphrey,
supra note 100.
which is needed for Geneva law implementation.
1 30
Apparently there has been some recognition of what we have outlined
(though perhaps only partial), for if we consider the operational system
proposed in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
we find that an attempt is made to by-pass the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights and to create a special Human Rights Committee.1 31 The new com-
mittee will receive reports of progress from parties to the treaty, study
reports, coimnent as appropriate, coordinate with the ECOSOC as appropriate,
consider state requests for examination of violations under certain restric-
tive conditions, or appoint a conciliation cormission with the consent of
all parties concerned, and submit an annual report of its activities through
the ECOSOC to the General Assembly.i32 Though hardly ground shaking in
functional ability, this Human Rights Committee does have some of the
qualities of continuity and directness which other organizational struc-
tures do not possess; but even the proposed comxittee represents an im-
perfect effort at best and it would not seem structurally competent to
handle the issues of Geneva rights in tixes of armed conflict.
Functional Needs and Capacities
Thus far in our focus on Geneva law effectiveness and supervisory
systems we have sought to discover some of the underlying qualities of
international law and its operative base, the nature and imperfections
of the implementary systems under the Geneva Conventions, and the strut:-
tural capacities for Geneva law implementation which presently exist and
1 30See id. at 92, 95-96, and 125 concerning the creation of the Ad
Hoe Working Group and its expanded powers (which even included the in-
vestigation of certain Geneva Convention violations by 1969). Carey
seems to conclude, however, that there is no real coordination withi
the U.N. structure. See id. at 92-93.
131International Covenant on Civil and Political Righcs, article
28, adopted by G.A. Res. 2200(XI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at 52-58,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (not yet in effect).
1 32See id., articles 40-42, and 45. These investigative aid con-
ciliatory functions already exist within the General Assembly and the
ECOSOC, and Article 44 of the Covenant recognizes that such organs may
still pursue their own procedures.
will predictably continue within the United Nations. Now, rather than
attempt to rationalize support for a new system as the fulfillment of
our functional needs, it would be better to identify and explore.the
various kinds of functions which a new entity could possess. This leaves
the ultivate form to its creators: but an actual proposal is offered in
Annex A which, though not itself critically analyzed, might prove useful
for further study and a constructive comunity effort.13 Furthermore,
it is recognized that all of the present participants in the international
legal process, especially those mentioned thus far, can in the aggregate
make a great contribution to Geneva law efficacy. However, the point is
that some new structure could have even more of an impact on law imple-
mentation and it is not assumed here that it is beyond the capacity of
present state elites participating in ongoing Geneva Conferences (such
as those designed to adopt new Geneva Protocols) to consider the types
of functions a new entity could possess and to reach a consensus on a
new constitutive instrument, or, perhaps, on an instrument which consti-
tutes several "split" (or loosely or informally integrated) organizational
entities which states could adopt with varying levels of approval by the
international co-munity. Certainly we can do better.
Though imperfect, the following functional categories are offered
here for analysis: (1) Goal value identification and clarification func-
tions, (2) Investigative functions, (3) Supervisory functions, (4) De-
liberative functions, (5) Recommendatory functions, (6) Application
functions, (7) Coordination functions, and (8) Enforcement functions
(not covered above).
1 3 4 It should be useful to relate these functions
133Note that the present ICRC Draft Protocols for supplementation
of the Geneva Conventions contain a reference to the creation of a new
international organization, but no such creature is offered for analy-
sis. See ICRC, I Basic Texts 3 (Art. 10) (Jan. 1972) (proposed draft
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, Conference of Governmental Experts,
Geneva, 3 May - 3 June 1972).
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These functions are categorized in a way which seems useful for
analysis in this particular question of Geneva law Implementation in the
context of a developing world public order. Users of the McDougal-Lass-
well approach will recognize that the value identification and investi-
gative categories utilized here touch upon XcDougal-Lasswell decisional
functions categorized as the Intelligence, Promotional (or Reconmenda-
tory), Prescribing and Invoking functions as well as the Appraisal func-
tion. The supervisory function used here correlates most closely to the
M1cDougal-Lasswell Intelligence, Promotion and Invoking functions, and
others may be correlated as follows: deliberative (Prescription); re-
commendatory (Recommendatory, Invocation, and Application); application
(Application--pre-enforcement phase); coordination (Invocation and Ap-
plication); and enforcement (Application--enforcement phase). Also, the
reader should nobi ?hat perforuance of any of these functions necessarily
to och cdncepts as usefulness or workability, certainty of jtandard,
flexibility, and acceptability. Any particular proposal should be analy-
zed with such concepts in mind, but here we can only allude to them in re-
lation to a general functional capacity.
1. Goal Value Identification and Clarification (Intelligence and Prescrip-
tion)
Perhaps one of the most important and needed functions today concerns
the authoritative identification and clarification of goal. values (legal
policy) and relevant expectations which the general comunity shares. Pre-
sently, there is no authoritative institutional structure for the identi-
fication of Geneva goal values and shared expectations (much less the pro-
cessing and dissemination of such) and the only type of state response
has involved sparse, ad hoc conferences or working groups of experts. The
only possible exceptions to this void are the useful efforts by the ICRC
in preparing co nmentaries to the Conventions, the U.N. Secretary General
in preparing reports and the continuous efforts of each to identify the
boundaries of consensus in connection with special problems and to pro-
pose'new drafts and Protocols for their solution. It seems that effective
Convention implementation would requir& a more authoritative and continuous
clarification of community policy and an up-to-date measurement of consen-
sus when several of the Geneva provisions are subject to new and expanded
interpretation as combat techniques, technological developments, changes
in the nature of aimed conflicts, prescriptive developments and trends in
decision in other interrelated legal spheres
1 3 5 stimulate new demands and
involves the use of other functions. See also Lasswell, supra note 29,at
86-93; Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 11, at 387; and McDougal, Lass-
well & Chen, supra note 4, at 260-264. In the last cited material, the
Intelligence function is said to also involve: advisory services, spe-
cial studies, the reporting system, observation, fact-finding missions,
investigation, and others. In McDougal & Feliciano at 351, there is an
indication that recommendatory functioning, when considered as a strate-
gy of sanction, can involve far more than the mere promotion of policy
for later prescriptive decision phase effort and can involve invocation
and application where "recommendations for the resolution of the imme-
diate situation" are made. It might also be helpful to point out that
prescription, as a strategy of sanction, can similarly involve an in-
terconnection of decision phases when the community resolutions are al-
so created for a sanction purpose.
135As in the development of general human rights, terrorism, re-
straints on the initiation of violence, weapons regulation, etc.
expectations of participants in the ongoing social process and create new
goal values which are relevant as guides to an authoritative interpreta-
tion of the various Geneva articles in context. We have explored above
the role of world community expectations as an operative base of law and
have recognized that rules per se cannot protect us from ourselves. With
these basic recognitions, it becomes evident that an authoritative insti-
tutional mechanism for expectation identification is necessary for a more
effective implementary effort.
Goal value identification could involve the authoritative provision-
al interpretation of terms, the development of new prescriptions or policy,
an appraisal of policy and the formulation of criteria for state or organi-
zational appraisal and response, communication of opposing demands or ex-
pectations, the growth and formation of consensus, research, data collec-
tion and sharing, and the coordination of Geneva precepts with other in-
ternational norms and developments (environmental and predispositional).
As Professors McDougal and Lasswell have remarked and we have allu-
ded to before:
The effective authority of any legal system depends
in the long run upon the underlying common ir.terests
of the participants in the system and their recogni-
tion of such common interests, reflected in continuing
predispositions to support the prescriptions and the
procedures that comprise the system.
1 3 6
And they also stated that "[e]ffective, comprehensive universality, des-
pite the faint shadows of worldwide organization does not exist. It is
for the future... ";137 which means that there are regional diversities
in rule interpretation and that in many instances the signatory powers
are only "rhetorically unified."
136McDougal & Lasswell, "The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse
Systems of Public Order," 53 Am. J. Int'lL. 1, 4-5 (1959).
117Id. at 3. The authors state that universal words do not imply
universal deeds. They have pointed out that the "universality" of in-
ternational law is not comprehensive, that different societies or re-
gions often perceive law in differing ways, and that there is sometimes
little more than a rhetorical unification (not an effective, comprehen-
sive mutuality of legal expectancies). Given the problems connected with
the formation of a consensus of legal expectations and the even more elu-
sive notion of .n international morality, it seems that law effectiveness
should more properly rest upon what Professors McDougal and Lasswel! term
the recognition by participants of shared expectations and "underl "
common interests" (e.., the mutuality of self-interest).
Professors McDougal and Feliciano have also expressed the notion
that rule prescription is a one time shot at the expression of community
expectation and that "rules" do not dictate specific decisions but "guide
the attention of decision-inakers to significant variable factors In typi-
cal recurring contexts of decision" and serve merely as "sumnary indices
to relevant crystallized community expectations.'138 Furthermore, they
state, "[a]mong the factors that bear immediately upon the prescription
and application of conmunity policy are common expectations as to the
character and efficiency of the technique and technology of violence." 
1 3 9
They add that tcchnological developments make plain the necessity of n-
tinued appraisal of goal-values and a search for dynamic expectation.N
How strange it seems that though the need for continuous goal value
identification and clarification has been recognized, men (or rather the
state elites with dominant state roles) have devised no means for such
continued activity within an institutional framework.1 41 Further, it
appears that a continuous meeting of signatory representatives in some
organizational structure could fulfill many of these functional needs
and that such an approach would also be workable, acceptable, flexible
in responsive capability, and provide a necessary continuity and certain-
ty of policy standards at given moments.142 To such an organized struc-
138HcDougal & Feliciano, "International Coercion and World Public
Order: The General Principles of the Law of War," 67 Yale L. J. 771,
815 (1958).
139 Id. at 805-806.
1401 Id., quoting The Flick Trial, 9 L.R.T.W.C. 23 (1949).
141The most notable private effort in this regard has been that of
Mr. Pictet of the ICRC. See, e.g., J. Pictet, The Principles of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law (1966).
The ICRC has proposed that a "meeting" of High Contracting Par-
ties be convened whenever the "Depositary State" or one-fifth of the sig-
nators or the ICRC request such, and that the representatives "study pro-
blems" concerning Geneva law "application" or likewise examine any amend-
ment proposed by a signator. See ICRC, I Basic Texts 7 (Art. 9) (Jan. 19-
72). Others (not to be mentioned here) have seriously proposed that im-
plementary needs be handled by national ombudsmen who might meet once in
a while (perhaps forming someday an unoffending group knowia as the Fra-
ternal brder of Ombudsmen). This last comment is by no means meant to
disparge the goal of supplementing an international implementary system
ture could be added subsidiary bodies for long tern, research and law
development;14 3 and advisory bodies on economic, medical, science and
technology, military, and other ,iatters could provide useful interdis-
ciplinary input for policy clarification, factor analysis, criteria for-
mulation, decision appraisal, or other purposes.
In connection with the Geneva Conventions, such a functional entity
could be designed to make authoritative provisional determinations con-
cerning questions presently left for each state to determine on its own
and often without a comprehensive input from various disciplines--cues-
tions such as: when do the Geneva Conventions apply to a conflict;-
4 4
how much of the provisions of the Conventions.are applicable; who is en-
titled to whai types of protection; in what circumstances; with what stra-
tegies of implementation; and so forth. Certainly some system for goal
value identification is required if these questions are to be adequately
and rationally answered in given situations, and if we are to move beyo-id
what Professor McDougal views as a mere "rhetorical unification' or what
Professor Claude has referred to as the imperfect institutional pattern
of "diplomacy by conference."1
45
with a U.S. national ombudsman or panel (commission). On such supple-
mentary goals, see "Telford Taylor Urges Inquiry on Vietnam by a Naticnal
Panel," N.Y.T., July 7, 1971 at 12, col. 1; letter to President Nixon by
the Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N.Y. (Jan. 12, 1972); and Senator
E. Kennedy, "Proposes A 'Military Practices Review Board In National Se-
curity Council" (April 29, 1971 press release) (a proposal largcly drawn
upon from Professor Gottlieb's remarks before the Senate Subcom:ittee on
Refugees Regarding the Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed Con-
flicts seven days earlier).
1 43These bodies should clarify prior and present goals (policy),
analyze past trends and conditioning factors which affected goal reali-
zation, project probable future trends and conditioning factors, and in-
vent, evaluate and recommend new alternatives where needed. See McDou-
gal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 4.
1'" See U. Levie, supra note 81, at 8, suggesting the creation of
such a functional power in an international system.
145 For Professor Claude's condemnation of this stage of institutional
development, see Claude, supra note 93, at 21-24.
2. Investigative Functions (Intelligence and Invocation).
Investigative functions can include the visitation of territory (ob-
servation); the survey of resources; the collection of data and making of
reports, appraisal and recommendations; the receipt of governmental, pri-
vate, and individual communications or petitions; the preparation of files
on individuals suspected of violating the law of the grand-jury-type pro-
ceedings for a similar purpose;146 and the conduct of hearings. Perhaps
law effectiveness would be best served if all of these functions became
operative through some system, but certain qualifications might have to
exist for scceptability among some signatories (especially the communist
bloc.).
There seems to be little doubt that these are also important func-
tional capacities, for as stated recently the "mere existence of an of-
ficial and impartial fact finding body might deter violations of human
rights.]147 It is also evident that these functional capacities have
been viewed by "sovereigns" with some fear and that investigative powers
of organizational entities have a tenuous existence unless specified in
an international agreement.148 John Carey has recognized this problem
of acceptability and has proposed a rather weak system of human rights
investigation involving formal investigation only where a government con-
sents and,then, with a secrecy of results until after the government has
146See Carey, supra note 98, at 63. Precedent exists for the use
of special observer/adviser representatives in certain actions by the
U.N. and the ICRC. See, e.g., Gottlieb, supra note 79, at 408-409 and
411-412. (Special Representative to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities--
appointed by the U.N. S.G. with the concurrence of Nigeria, and Special
Representative to Israeli Occupied areas). See also Kutner, "World Ha-
beas Corpus: Ombudsman for Mankind," 24 U. Miami L. Rev. 352 (1970).
For reconmmendations for the establishment of judicial machinery for the
indictment of individual violators, see Carey, supra and Gottlieb, supra
at 410.
147From the Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights (March
22-27, 1968), quoted in Carey, id. at 84. See also 2 Israel Yrbk. on 1I.R.
154 (1972), on the need for a fact authenticating process; Gormley, "The
Use of Public Opinion and Reporting Devices to Achieve World Law: Adop-
tion of ILO Practices by the U.N.," 32 Albany L. Rev. 273 (1968), cited
in Cormley, 'Future Implementation of the Universal Declaration of Hu--In
Rights by States, Multinational Institutions, and Private Organizations,"
work paper, Abidjan World Conference on World Peace Through Law (Aug. 26-
31, 1973); and stpra note 107.
143As in the case of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, as described by J. Carey, supra note
been given a chance to correct deficiencies. 
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- Pre~entlythe Ad Hoc
Working Group has been granted authority by the Human Rights Coirission
to receive communications, hear ,itnesses, use "such modalities of pro-
cedure as it may deem appropriate," and recommend action to be taken;
but the group may only investigate certain cases.
Many types or degrees of investigatory capacity are possible and
the ultimate form for Geneva law implementation will depend upon the
parties to the Conventions; but there exists one aspect worth further
study since it involves the opportunity for direct individual input in-
to the investigative and general legal process. it is the systematized
use of the individual and non-governmental petitions, if not the crea-
tion of an actual forum for individual rights enforcement.
1 5 0 Rita IIau-
ser has stated:
The Permanent Court of International Justice au-
thoritatively ruled in 1928 in the Danzig Railway
Official's case that if by a particular treaty the
parties intend to confer rights on individuals, those
rights should be recognized and enforced under inter-
national law.
The best illustration of this rule would be found
in the Geneva Conventions of 1949....
1 5 1
98, at 85-87, and recent problems in connection with investigations in-
to Geneva law application in the Mideast conflicts. See also Humphrey,
supra note 100, at 7.
1 4 9Carey, supra note 98, at 92.
1 5 0 See Annex B. For a recent case of the first monetary award to
an individual for human rights deprivations in the European system, see
The Ringeisen case, reported in 11 Int'l L. Mat. 1062 (1972). The case
should prove to be a significant precedent.
151R. Hlauser, "Int'l Law and Basic Human Rights," 23 Naval War Col-
lege Rev. 51 (1971). In accord, letter to the author from Mr. Pilloud,
Director of Principles and Law, ICRC, dated 26 August 1971, stating:
"Some of the provisions' of the ].949 Geneva Conventions distinctly Lmply
the existence of the right of indi'iduals to seek application of the
Conventions." See Annex B.
Whether or not enforcement of individual rights is granted, however, re-
mains to be seen. But absent even actual enforcement there are great
uses tn be made of the individual petition as an investigative aid. As
John Carey has stated:
It has been persuasively argued that the most relevant
sources of htnaan rights information are neither govern-
ments nor NGOs but actual alleged victims or persons
close to them.
152
He also stated that by 1970 eleven European states had accepted the op-
tional right of individual petition provided in Article 25 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights,153 and that individual petitions are
used systematically at regional levels while there is evidence that the
number of individual complaints is not excessive nor an undue strain on
the regional bodies or the national governments concerned (thus, point-
Ing to acceptability and workability of such a policy responsive modality).
15 2Carey, supra note 98, at 135.
153Id. at 38, n. 8.
1541d. at 136. See also Boyle & Hannum, "Individual Applications
Under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Concept of Adminis-
trative Practice: The Donnelly Case," 68 Am. J. Int'l L. 440 (1974);
Schwelb, "The Abuse of the Right of Petition," 3 H.R.J. 313 (1970); Wil-
koc, "Procedures to Deal with Individual Communications to Int'l Bodies:
The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities," 1 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 277 (1968); and Parson, "The Indi-
vidual Right of Petition: A Study of Methods Used by Int'l Orgs. to Uti-
lize the Individual as a Source of Info. on the Violations of Human Rights,"
13 Wayne L. Rev. 678 (1967). For a view of recently adopted provisional
procedures in the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination, see
Sub-Comm. Res. 1 (14 Aug. 1971), E/CN.4/Sub. 2(MXIV) CRP. 6 (38 Aug. 1971)
(Dist. Restricted). The requirements for admissibility are detailed and
in general there must be reasonable grounds to believe that the petition
"may reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violatjons
of human rights and fundamental freedoms..." A "Model Communication" form
for an individual petition to the Inter-American Commission on fluiian RighLs
can be found in the O.A.S., Inter-Am. Comm. on II.R., H1andbook of £-istLng
Rules Pertaining to Human Rights 48-49 (1970). For relevant statistics
in the European context a most useful publication is Council of Europe.
European Commission of Human Rights, Di(72)2 (Strasbourg, Feb.1172). At-
though trends in regional organizational petitioning have been encouraging,
there is a noted problem with past U.N. practice which will ho 'efully
change now with the new Secretary Ceneral. See Lillich, "The U.N. and
Certainly the use of individual petitions could constitute a con-
structIve step forward in allowing nore individual participation in the
law creation and application processes. Moreover, it suems that icdiv_-
dual petitions and even judicial remedies or individuai causes of action
are critical to effectiveness of the law and that we cannot allow tie svs-
tcm to remain aloof from the hlman values and experiences that more direct
personal involvement in the legal process could provide. Furthermore, such
individual renedius or irvoking mechanisms could provide some meaning (in,
predisposition and practice) to the principle enunciated in Article 3 of
the 1943 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (and concomitant human
rights documents) that everyone has the right to an effective remedy by
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by law. (Note that Annex B proposes a more detailed recog-
nition of this principle.) Certainly regional impleentary mechanisms
should strive to make this principle more effective whan interrelated
claims arise under the Geneva Conventions and regional human rights ins-
trnents. And one way of assuring a more "effective remedy-by competent
national tribunals" is to adopt sanction strategies which will realis-
tfcally meet the need for injunctive relief to preserve the situation
to that claims can be made to national tribunals for national tribunal
relief. Too often commentators have been content with proposals for com-
pensatory relief at the direction of an international tribunal and have
not focused on the sanction objectives relating to prevention, deterrence,
restoration, or even correction of individual vilators except in war sP
tuations. Even a claim for compensatory relief could involve claims for
injunctive relief invoked by the individual claimant, though some have
rather simplistically asserted that questions of remedy for individuals
merely involve after-the-fact determinations and that state elites are
the only competent participants in the legal process for the raising of
other sanction objective questions.
There remain certain questions concerning individual petitions, for
example: should the mode be open to non-victims, indirect victims, anony-
mous petitioners, non-goverritental groups, or everyona in any format? The
answers might depend upon investigative purposes, capabilities of an in-
vestigative entity, or even degrees of actual consent of the state coh-
cerned. No single approach to the problem has been woiked out in the re-
gional human rights instruments, the U.N. entity procedures, or the 1966
Covenants and Protocol, and it would appear that consensus is still de-
veloping and that developments are sometimes rapid, sometimes slow, in
this area. It seems that as early as 1815 international bodies were con-
sidering certain comunications from private groups,
1 5 5 and the United Ka-
Hluman Rights Complaints: U Thant as Strict Constructionist," 64 Am. J.
Int'l L. 610 (1970), and references cited.
155Id. at 130 (Congress of Vienna).
tions framework allows for some private informational iinut under the
Charter itself; 1 5 6 but a recent effort in the area of hu-nn rights has
only been able to offer such a modality in an Optional Protocol and then
with certain limitations which could ajmost quilify the "right" of peti-
tion out of existence. 1 5 7 Practice under the European Convention, how-
ever, has been more substantial and promising; and even practice under
U.N. entities has been expanding.1 53 The point of emphasis here is that
individuals do participate in the ongoing international legal process,
whether as law creators, mere claimants, sanctioners, etc., and it is
incorrect to argue tlat individual input has never been allowed in inter-
national organizations before the 1950's.
1 5 9
3. _Supervisory Functions (Intelligence, Promotion, and Invocation)
These entail the creation of entity capability for men to gjard
each other against their own excesses and to supervise action for the
purpose of implementing identified and clarified policies. These func-
tions, when coordinated with the goal value identification and clarifi-
cation and the investigative functions, form the heart of any preventive
law program and probably the only crucial organizational capacities needed
for law effectiveness (much of the other functions involve after-the-
fact or community "response" functions, and would not be needed if prior
sanction strategy had worked).
156See U.N. Charter, Articles 57 and 71; and Carey, supra note 98,
at 137-138 (the ILO, for example, allows NCO petitions if the NGO is
situated within the offending country, but the ILO does not allow di-
rec individual petitions). For some views of the ILO experience, see
Johnston, The International Labour Organization (1970); and W. Gormley,
supra note 147.
.Note that the U.N. Discrimination and Minority Sub-Commission has
adopted rules on admissibility of conunications from non-governmental
sources, and the Sub-Committee on Petitions of the General Assembly Com-
mittee of 24 on decolonization considered proposals for guidelines on
admissibility (including anonymous petitions and communications origina-
ting inside or outside of the relevant territory). See 6 U.N. Law Rep.
No. 1, at 1 (Carey ed., Sept. 1971).
157Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966) (persons must be subject to the jurisdiction of the offending
state and no anonymous petitions are presently accepted).
158Se___e Council of Europe, European Commission of Human Rights, supnra
note 154. See also Carey, "Progress on Huknan Rights at the United Nations,"
66 Am. J. Int'l L. 107 (1972); and supra nate 154.
159See, McA., cDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 4, at 256
Supervisory functions can include investigative capacities, control,
trouble shooting roles, trial observation, training and education, pro-
tection, and coordination with or implementation of humanitarian fu'nctions.
We have already discussed the supervisory roles contemplated under the
Geneva Protecting Power system, and such functional capacities could be
incorporated into an organization to aid in Geneva Convention implementa-
tion. Already the ICRC has been active in tile promotion of policy and
new responses to humanitarian needs (as far as their overall institu-
tional objectives and capacities will permit). The ICRC has been active
in arranging conferences of experts (governmental and some non-goveriren-
tal) to consider new policy and implementing possibilities, has promoted
the results of such meetings, and has even recently urged that pprties
to the 1973 Mid East war apply new proposed Geneva Protocols designed to
assure greater protection of civilians.i 6 0 Of course, the ICRC has been
quietly active as a Convention supervisor. Another proposal has been.
made by Professor Howard Levie for the creation of an International Com-
mittce for the Enforcement of Human Rights during Armed Conflict (ICEIMRAC)
which would have the authority to "police compliance with the law of arned
conflict" and to enter territory of each party to the cor.flict, 1 6 1 Along
and 261-267; H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1950),
Paust, "My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths, and Leader Responsibility,"
57 Nil. L. Rev. 99, 119-123 (1972); and Paust, supra note 38.
160See "Red Cross Urging Cod? on Civilians," N.Y.T., Oct. 12, 1973,
at 18:3.
161n esrLventdtaH. Levie, supra note 81, at 5 and 8. Professor Levie noted that
rrance had recommended the creation of a High International Committee for
the Protection of Humanity at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference but the re-
commendation did not receive necessary support, Professor Levie's work
considers another supervisory function--the supervision of population
safety zones. See also U.N. S.C. Report A/7720, supra note 54, at 49-
51. A recent attempt to create such a zone under ICRC supervision occur-
red in Bangladesh in the city of Dacca. See Wash. Post, Dec. 9, 1971 at
16:1. There is presently no entity more capable or acceptable than the
ICRC for the performance of this safety zone supervisory function. As
the use of this particular protection mechanism expands it should foster
a further recognition of the need for some new Geneva law implementation
institution. The U.N., however, did engage in substantial emergency re-
lief cperations. See Gottlieb, supra note 108.
these lines, it is suggested here that an additional entity 4hich might
prove to be both useful and more acceptable to the parties to the Con-
ventions might be called: Convention Impler:entation Advisers :They
could operate in coordination with a High Comissioner and educational
staffs so as to provide advice to states concerning alternative means
of law implementation, operative techniques, training, and education
or preventive law programs. Such an entity could aid decision-makers
at all levels by providing skilled guidance and specific options for
law compliance, thus bringing policy directly into a problem context for
"policy responsive" solutions at the local level.
Another important supervisory function involves "impartial" obser-
vation of trials under a state signatory or other entity system. The
Geneva Conventions had recognized the need for impartial trial observa-
tion when trial by captors of prisoners of war (pws ) and civilians (at
leasst in occupied territory) occurred. The Conventions placed this trial
observation responsibility under the Protecting Power systemw.'-h certain
other possibilities mentioned in case of the failure to appoint a Protect-
ing Power.1 63 Furthermore, fundamental due process guarantees for the
trial of all persons accused of having committed breaches of the Conven-
tions were placed within the ambit of what the Protecting Power should
guard~and the Protecting Power's presence during trial was itself recog-
nized as one of these fundamental due process requirements. Since the
trial of a pw, a war criminal, or any person by the capturing power (even
if generally fair) could result in increased hostility and violence (in-
cluding "reprisals" for the trial), it would seem necessary for any par-
ty to an armed conflict to seek some mea-s of impartial tridl observa-
tion and possibly some means of trial by neutrals for Convention breaches
162Already the ICRC and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UN-
HCR)have been accepted in the role of an implementation adviser, and
other trends in human rights advisory services point to a ready utility
and acceptability of such an expert Geneva law entity. Certainly a go-
vernment desirous of useful advise and practical experience with law im-
plementation would welconie such an advisory role. See also 6 U.N.L.Rep.
45-46 (J. Carey ed. Aug. 1972) on the U.N. Seminar on the Status of Wo-
men and Family Planning in Istanbul (July 1972) and the use of the U1I[CR
by the Secretary General to assume primary responsibility for coordina-
ting a twelve month program for Southern Sudan.
'63See, e.g., GP, arts. 100-101, 104-105, and G.C., art. 74. See
also GPW, arts. 82, 84, 99, 102, 107, and 129-130, and G.C., arts. 71-
72 and 74; and J. PicLet, 3 Commentary at 491-492. GPW, art. 105 is
listed as one of the fundamental due process measures under Geneva law.
See GPW, Art. 129 and G.C., Art. 146.
or at least the "partial" observation by the country or power of origin
so as to avoid the difficulties inherenz in trials of enemy combatants
or civilians while the armed conflict still continues. The other possi-
bility is that trials be postponed until the end of the conf]ict; but the
usual practice is that no trial occurs in such instances.164 Furthermore,
the growing demnands and e::pectations concerning human rights of a minimal
due process would seem to require some form of outside observation, except
-in cases where state security is directly involved and to a necessarily
prejudicial degree, if the fortm state is at all politically pragmatic
and there can be no-doubt that demands and expectations would incorporate
recently documented due process requirements.1 65 What form the actual -su-
pervision mechanism will take should be left to the signatories who are in
the process of amending the Conventions and perhaps some flexibility in
format should be offered for wider acceptability while the forum state re-
tains the freedom to choose among several trial observation options speci-
fically mertioned and created for service upon request. Some form of Ge-
neva Protocol recognition of trial observation mechanisms should bz made,
however, anr the time would seem ripe for acceptance of a proposal which
retains sore.flexibility.! 6 6 There has been a long history of workable
.trial obbe-rvation, reporting and due process implementation among U.S.
and other states which cculd not only provide an immediate framework for
Geneva law and human rights implementation in cases of trail of foreign
nationals by one of these governments, but which could also provide a use-
ful experiential background for those involved with international obser-
vation of Geneva signatory trials and for those who do not have such a
It has often been suggested that during the conflict it would
not be fair to try captured persons due to the unavailability of evi-
dence for the defense, witnesses, etc., and to hostile feelings which
are likely to permeate the proceedings. See, e.g., J. Pictet, 3 Com-
mentary at 422 and 626, and 4 Commentary at 596. Quite possibly it
could be equally unfair in some cases to await the end of the conflict,
since some conflicts (notably Vietnam) have continued for years or decades.
16See, ., Paust, "Human Rights, Human Relations, and Overseas
Command, 3 The Army Lawyer 105 (Jan. 1973), reprinted in13 Revue de Droit
Penal Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre (Brussels, 1974).
166The ICRC, as well as many NGOs, has a long historic interest in
some form of trial supervision by international observers and might back
such a proposal in the 1973 summer Conference or thereafter. See Veuthey,
"The Red Cross and Non-Int'l Conflicts," 113 Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross
411, 418 (1970). Moreovcr, the governmcnt of the People's Republic of
Bangladesh propose4 to further a new trend of inviting foreign trial ob-
background of experience and institutional arrangements themselves.1
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Finally, it should be mentioned that the Red Cross has provided im-
plementary aid in connection with trial observation and the broader edu-
cation and advisory areas. ICRC publications, such as the recent Teacher's
Manual and Soldier's Manual, are most useful and the United States Army
has recently adopted similar instruction aids.168 It is well known that
other governments could expani their training programs and, no doubt, even
the best troop educators could expand their programs. Indeed, signators
have a duty under the Conventions to educate the entire populace (not
Just the soldier) on the Geneva precepts,1 69 and it would seem that not
only should more be done in this area but that most states would welcome
expanded education and guidance functioning so as to more greatly assure
that their state will not become known for violations of the Conventions.
Too often it is forgotten that the soldier, after all, was at one time a
member of the civilian population and that most of his psychological pre-
dispositions are well formed by the time he joins the military forces or
initiates violence on his own or in connection with some nengovernmental
or "private army". Furthermore, it has not been unknown (in prior con-
flicts or in Vietnam) that members of the civilian community have derro-
gated from the Conventions in the past. An expanded educative role could
even include programs of public broadcasts, lectures, advertisements, or
other media usage, human rights seminars, seminars integrating human with
"civil" rights, fellowship programs for individual study, and emphasis in
primary and secondary schooling.1 0 It is not too difficult to imagine
forms of civilian education, nor to initiate effort in that direction if
persons get iavolved.
servers to forthcoming war crimes trials. See Paust & Blaustein, supra
note 57, and documents section.
1 67For a useful analysis of the U.S. experience in trial observation
under NATO SOFA, see Williams, "An American's Trial in a Foreign Court:
The Role of the Military's Trial Observer," 34 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1966); and
A.R. 27-50, Status of Forces Policies, Procedures, and Information (1967).
168See 125 Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross 439 (1971).
169 See text, supra.
170See Carey,_supranote 98, at 17, noting the recent U.N. efforts
(e.g., G.A. Res. 2445 and 2447(XXIII) (1969) and the new UNESCO publica-
tions). On implementary techniques for publicity, dissemination, and
education within state entities, see U.N. S.C. Report A/7720, supra note
54, at 41-43; Int'l Institute of !lumaniLarian Law, Seminar Res., Guide-
lines for Military Instruction (Sanremo, Italy, Nov. 1972); U.S. Army Sub.
4. Deliberative Function, (Prescription)
Necessarily, deliberative functions would already have been involved
in goal value identification roles, but deliberative functions can also
serve to focus community eyes on specific problems through discussion,
consideration, and voting. This function is termed deliberative in or-
der to emphasize a functioning beyond politicized rhetoric and also to
point out that hesitant state elites need not necessarily fear that the
outcomes of such a process would be viewed as "bindLng" legislative pre-
scriptions as such. The results can lead to coennunity response function-
ing or merely to a. cooperative airing of difficulties depending upon the
consensus at the time. It is a necessary functional capacity for any or-
ganization and it has been "customary in all international organizations
that there should be one organ comprising all members or their represen-
tatives."1 7 1 Furthermore, such a process may be more "workable" in the
long run when there is representative participation by all signatories to
the Conventions instead of a select committee of experts performing the
deliberative functions, and it is likely to be viewed as more authorita-
tive as well. One caveat here, however, is that law implementation can-
not depend upon an institutionalized practice of "diplomacy by confere.:,ce"
or a mere continuation of Geneva Conferences. Some additional functions
have to be established to get beyond the approach of creating new rules
for the protection of human beings as if the words can protect us from
ourselves.
1 7 2
One should inquire more deeply though itint a"voting" system, for al-
though states have traditionally had a one state-one vote approach to non-
sensu. formulation, there are changes of thought concerning the effective-
ness of such a voting system when (1) states are no longer regarded as
the sole participants in the constitutive processes nor as the sole au-
thority groupings or institutional structures, and (2) there are great
differences among states in terms of: (a) bases of power such as popu-
lation, technological development, military capability, financial capa-
bility, and (b) institutional patterns of shaping and sharing these base
values. Questions might be asked as to whether population differences
Sched. 27-1, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Convention No. IV
of 1907 (1970); U.S. D.A. Pam. 27-200, The Law of Land Warfare--A Self
Instruction Text (1972); and D.A. Training Cir. TC 27-12, Your Conduct
in Combat: under the law of war (test edition, April 1973).
17 1Goodrich and IHambro, supra note 117, at 149.
1 7 2 For some interesting aspects of the futility of a program of im-
plementation which is primarily dependent upon "diplomacy by confererce."
see Claude, sizpra._ note 93, at 21-24; cf. id. at 285-303 on institutional
It Tiplomacy" in connection with conflict management and U.N.
Secretary General efforts in a context of cold war confrontation and su-
per power politIcal inabilities.
should be a predominant criterion because of the need for a human consen-
sus measurement and the serving of the goal of wide particirarion in the
decisional processes as opposed to mere state elite consensus and parti-
cipation, or whether certain attributes of power should prevail due to a
need for compliance with the outcomes of the institutional decision pro-
cess and the support of power to legal efficacy. The author would pro-
pose a wide participation of persons or groups without weigntings of pow-
er, since power often shifts but community consensus is not only a pre-
ferred goal itself but can also be an important base for authority and
control. Questions in this area include considerations as to whether
only state elites should be represented. Should weighted voting and
state elite voting be adopted in some dual format to allow a more com-
prehensive (though still inadequate) consensus identification beyond
the mere consensus of "sovereign" elites? Should state votes be split
up into components corresponding to the divergent views prevailing with-
in a state? Should regional consensus be considered and have regional
priority whera it can be demonstrated? Should we take public opinion
polls or are these inadequate as well since they do not always provide
a pattern of consensus over time?
The possible questions and combinations seem endless,'but we should
not forget that even the raising of such questions helps to point out
some of the inadequacies of a mere state elite consensus. We must not
forget as well, however, that in the present stream of history our re-
presentative authority focus is on the state; and as the Geneva Conven-
tions remain primarily a treaty law to which states are parties, it seems
that a state elite consensus as a measure of representative authority will
probably be included in any Geneva law organization voting system. But
a problem still remains as to whether the institutional set up will be
authoritative enough for national or other decision-makers (whether execu-
tive, legislative, judicial, administrative). Certainly a decision-maker
can supplement state elite consensus with whatever empirical evidence he
can obtain from sociological inquiry and perhaps some form of dual voting
format which would allow state elite and population weighting would be
useful in that regard. Here the preference for population weighting is
aligned with goals mentioned above, and this seems more useful than weight-
ings based upon more fluctuating factors such as technological, economic,
military, political, and other developments. It is not suggested, how-
ever, that we can look merely to population statistics and assume that
state elite votes are representative of the population from which the
state elite derives its position--some type of inquiry should be made
into the extent of sharing of power in the internal political process
before such a conclusion could stand, and even this slight intrusion
would seem to require decision-makers to go beyond state elite consen-
sus and population weighting in order to grasp through comprehensive
analysis the contextually more realistic base of legal efficacy--the
actual extent of shared expectations and deaunds in the comunity of
man. Perhaps some day technology will allow men to consider problems
and give input on important issues through a system of ho:me media re-
ceiving and input or response mechanisms, thus partially eliminating the
need for a "representative" decision-making institution in certain areas
and the adoption of a "population response" system; but this is for the
future.
Whatever the consensus measurement format, it is good to keep in mind
the preferred goal of wide participation (the widerthe more inclusive).
This preferred goal rests upon a premise that greatet participation in
the prescriptive process is more preferrable than selective representa-
tion (or deference to elitist notions that small groups might consider
all factors in a more "workable" manner--two questionable conclusions).
It is not only preferrable for democratic (or, in purely ideological
myth, communist) value enhancing purposes, but also for law enhancing
purposes since the greater the participation, the higher the potential
for comprehensive analysis, a real consensus of expectation, inclusi-
vity in identifications and demanded value outcomes, contextual realism
and Lhe desired outcome of an efficacious Geneva law or policy realization
in practice. Furthermore, there is a greater likelihood of an increasing
desire of participants in the world process to perpetuate and defer tc a
constituted structure and decisional process in which participation is
wide. Exclusion of any state, group, or individual input into the pre-
scriptive process (as in others) can only diminish law efficacy in the
long run--it cannot enhance it or make it more "workable".
5. Community Response Functions (Invocation and Application)
Here we can group the last four functions together since they in-
volve organizational responses to events in the social process or re-
sponses to claims of "right" deprivation which have already occurred.
The Recommendatory function can include power to recommend action or
xegotiation ("good offices", mediation, persuasion, etc.) as a means
of initiating a process of dispute settlement or application of law
to claims. The Application function is a decisional function which
can include power to make authoritative and controlling determinations,
to pursue the remedies (sanction objectives) of exposure, pressure, or
condemnation, and to participate in an arbitral or judicial capacity.
Actually, in its broadest sense, all associations of legal precepts with
human conduct for characterization purposes involve application function-
ing and this application of law also involves intelligence, promotion,
enforcement, and other functions as components of the decision process.
Here we have in mind some designation of the more formalized institu-
tional process for authoritative decision functioning primarily as an
apply~ng organ. The Coordination function as a response function can
include contact with and recommendation to other international enti-
ties, the ICRC, regional organizations, private and other groups) and
can involve the diplomatic and ideological strategies of sanction in
most cases. Enforcement could include direct or indirect coercion
authorization of unilateral or multilateral action, and various types
of sanction objectives (plus diplomatic, ideological, economic, and
military strategies for the achievement of sanction objectives such
as prevention, deterrence, restoration, correcti:n, rehabilitation, 
etc.). 173
As a general matter, it would seem that coercive enforcement should be
left to the United Nations machinery ar one ie.-) and to nation-state
systems of criminal prosecution at the other, vit a prevention sanction-
ing objective the primary concern of the Geneva inplementary structure.
For example, if an international penal system is needed to supplement
the present state prosecution process (and this v;uid seem desirable),
it might be better to have such a system coordinz-ied through the United
Nations than through the more limited focus inherent in Geneva law Jm-
plementation.174 Similarly, conflict managemen: questions, including
the more broad focus on initiation of coercion azross state boundaries
and collective sanction activity which utilizes force or the threat of
force against states or large groups, should be :eft to the United Na-
tions since it is set up to deal with these queszions and duplication
here would not seem beneficial.
One expert has made a perceptive statement :hich might be useful
in focusing o., organizational response functions; he stated:
The most effective method for enhancir.: and protecting
human rights.. .would include investigzzion and negotia-
tion, followed where nccessary by pulifcity, and in ex-
treme cases by impartial judicial procedures ... 175
The same author states that exposure is a useful means for seeking com-
173For an extensive and useful categorizatioan of sanction policies,
see Lasswell, supra note 29, at 103. For an extremely useful and com-
prehensive framework for inquiry into the community sanctioning process,
see McDougal & Feliciano at 261-333. It is not possible here to make
such a comprehensive analysis of sanctioning przzess (participants, ob-
Jectives-perspectives, situations, base, or resaurce values, strategies,
outcomes, effects) including an integrated analysis of all strategies
(diplomatic, ideological, economic, military) in connection with all
sanction objectives (prevention, deterrence, re-soration, correction,
rehabilitation, reconstruction). See McDougal L Feliciano at 280-353.
.174For proposals for an international crizfnal court to supplement
present state prosecution capacities, see, e., Kutner, "Politicide:
The Necessity of an Int'l Court of Criminal Justice," 2 Denver J. Int'l
L. & Pol. 55 0.972); Stone, An International Criminal Court (Geneva 19-
71); Kutner, "World Habeas Corpus, Human Rights, and World Community,"
17 DePaul L. Rev. (1967); Wright, "Proposal for an Int'l Criminal Court,"
46 Am. J. Int'l L. 63 (1952); and Pella, "Towars an Int'l Criminal Court,"
44 Am. 3. Inl L. 37 (1950). See also Kutner, World Habeas Corpus (1962).
1 75Carey, supra note 98, at 173.
pliance as it is "lkelv to exercise something of a brake on the authori-
ties;" 1 7 6 but he also states that direct forms of irtense coercion (uhi.h
he labels "sanction") have "twin drawbacks of incffectiveness and poiiti-
cal sensitivity, "177 and are unreliable bec'ause they usunl, fail to com-
pel action and states fail to use them fully as a technique. 1 7 8 Another
noted figure has made a relevant generality that "coercive powers.. .will
be of little effectiveness for a very long time to come .... owing to the
persistence of the belief in the myth of national sovereignty and its in-
violability." 1 7 9 1any of the difficulties, however, might arise from the
U.N. context and overriding political considerations rather than from the
usefulness of techniques of coercion per se; but it may well be better
to leave higher level ceercion to the United Nations framework due to
its authoritative and primary interest in conflict management and general
international peace and security.
Certainly proper, however, would be efforts to exercise power in
the recoirmendatory, coordination and application functional areas, and
the contributing use of a High Commissioner (for negotiation and univer-
sal affectation of perspective) and an arbitral arrangement would seem
most desirable at this time.1 8 0 Negotiation or Reconendatory function
Id. at 109, 36 and 119 (stating that the U.N. Ad Hoc Working
Group's "chief weapon is exposure" and public opinion). Note that ICRC
reports on countries are rarely publicized. Td. at 101; but when they
are some results seem to flow Td. at 118. Secrecy may be of some bene-
fit in state to state negotiations, but not necessarily of predominant
value in seeking law compliance.
1 7 71d. at 36. Note that there are many types and intensities of
sanction, supra note 151, so this statement must be viewed as a genera-
lity.
Id at 34, stating: "Too many influences affect third-party govern-
ments besides the plight of the victims." See id. at 22-27, concerning
possible sanctions and those utilized in opposition to South Africa's ra-
cial policies. Note that sanctions against Rhodesia seam to finally be
having some effect, khough violations of U.N. Security Council resolu-
tions have occurred (notably by the U.S. and other big powers since the
time of the Nixon administration). See N.Y. Times, April 18, 1973, at 5:3.
1 7 9 Statement of Ambassador Richardson of Jamaica, id. at 12.
1 8 0 For an analysis of U.N. developments, see Id. at 70-78. Note
that the "most vigorous opposition to such a High Commissioner comesL
from the socialist (communist) cotrtrics;" id. at 71.
precedents abound and are to be found in recent practices under the ins-
titutlon of the U.N. High Commissioner for Rcfugees (UIICR) which actually
succeeded earlier efforts tinder the Leaiue of Nation.,, the ILO Fact-Find-
ing and Conciliation on Freedom of Association body, the Eurcpean system
under the regional Convention on Uuman Ri, hts, the inter-American Co:mmis-
sion accomplishments, the Conciliation Commission under the 1966 Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and the office of the Secretary General of
the United Nations, not excluding, of course, the achievements of the ICRC.
In contemplating the possible roles of an arbitration tribunal, it
should be kept in mind that although there exists a long record of com-
pliance with judicial and arbitral decisions prior to 1947,182 it seems
that since then there have occurred a number of serious instances of sys- 13
tem failure (pointing again to a primary need for preventive law mechanisms).
Perhaps arbitration is to he preferred more than judicial decision; and,
in any casethe jurisdiction should rest on a consensual basis (our aim
being the most practical means of achieving law effectiveness absent a
benevolent dictator). Howaver, use of judicial powers could be made in
cases where an organ seeks an advisory opinion, 4 or where there is
some likelihood of utility as when public pressure could be greatly en-
hanced even though the offender is not amenable to sanctions or is not
likely to comply directly with court determinations. It may also be use-
ful to explore the European Convention on Human Rights framework in more
detail since individual petitions are considered there first by the Com-
mission and then might proceed to either the Committee of Ministers or
to the Court of Human Rights, but they usually go to the Committee of
Ministers for a somewhat more politically feasible solution in the con-
text of developing European integration and developing individual righ.is
of participation in the implementary process.185 Whatever the nature of
1 81 See ibid.; and Bissel, "The ICRC and the Protection of Human Rights,"'
1 Human Rights J. 255 (1968).
1 82See id. at 43-46. Professor Hans Morgenthau found fewer than
ten cases of noncompliance in the 150 years prior to 1947, id. at 44;
but today Oscar Schacter predicts that if compulsory jurisdiction was
adopted there would be a greater chance of noncompliance with decisions,
id. at 46.
1 83See also U.N., I.L.C., Draft Code of Arbitral Procedures, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/S!:R.A(l956); J. Ralston, International Arbitration from Athens
to Locarno (1929). For an up to date and thorough analysis of arbitration
practice and potential, see W.M. Reisman, Nullity and Revision (1971).
1 84See U.N. Charter, Art. 96.
18 See Carey, supra note 98, at 38-39 and.42. The European Court
had heard only five cases by 1970 and each involved some Commission ac-
the structure adopted at Geneva for a fornalized application decisional
function (arbitral, judicial., or othl.r). it -might be us;eful to have a
wide dispersion of aplying arenas (as well as investigative and super-
visory functional entities) so as to more gruatly assvre integration of
effort, inclusivity, a ready access for various; participants, and a re-
gional expertise which could prove extremely useful fcr acceptability
(authority), identification of particularized expectation which supple-
ments Geneva precepts, crisis anticipation, contextual realism, and ef-
ficacious response (authoritative control).
Conclusion
In this short article we have attempted to explore the operative
basis of Geneva law, the sovereign inhibitions to Geneva law effective-
ness, present system capacities, and general functional possibilities
available for improving implementation. Far from being perfect,the above
inquiry into functional capactiies and potential does offer a basis for
further study and concrete results in a field of urgenc human need and
concern. We have gone far beyond present considerations by government
e>perts at the ongoing Geneva Conferences designed to establish Proto-
cols for supplementing the Conventions which have, so far as is known
to the author, only raised the question of national ombudsmen and a con-
tinuation of the diplomatic conference at the request of state elites
or thc ICRC; and yet I do not feel that we have gone beyond the poten-
tial for positive action or the expectations of those who ask why man
cannot devise some better means to protect the victims of warfare. It
is recognized, however, that the establishment of a particular structural
arrangement for Geneva law implementation by governmental experts will
not guarantee complete normative efficacy or a break from the practical
"realities" of state elite dominance. We must try, however, and a new
structural arrangement can incrementally affect patterns of authority
and control. And some change in that regard, even if only incremental,
seems worth the effort. To the author such is far more desireable than
to continually operate under the "unrealistic" systems capabilities--
past and present systemic responses are simply inadequate in view of
shared policies, growing demands, more pervasive expectations, and an
increasing interdependence of people and events in the global arena.
What institutions men actually create in an effort to guard each other
is a matter of future development and speculation. Surely new institu-
tions will eventually emerge, however, and it is hoped that the present
inquity and proposals will offer some basis for rational effort and the
continuing endeavor toward peace and an improved human existence.
tion, but since then there i; some promise for more Court involvement.
See also Council of Europe, European Conunission of Human Rights, supra
note 154.
ANNEX A
THE GENEVA COVENAIT ON CONVENTION I.PLEMENTATION
THE STATES PARTIES TO THE PRESENT COVENANT,
Noting the almost universal acceptance of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
by States as binding law "and human expectation,
Affirming the fact that any situation to which the Geneva Conventions
apply cannot solely constitute a matter of domestic concern within the
jurisdiction of one Party but constitutes an event or matter of inter-
national importance and human concern,
Noting that situations to which the Geneva Conventions apply can also
constitute a basis for affectation of international peace and security,
Considering that in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the
Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family
is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the
human person.
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United
Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and freedoms,
Noting the universal acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as the embodiment of normative values of the human community,
Determined to reaffirm belief in all fundamental human rights in time
or armed conflict and the dignity and worth of our fellow human beings,
and to establish effective machinery to promote conditions under which
respect for the obligations arising under international law can be main-
tained and the law can become effective,
Agree upon the following articles:
Chapter I. General Structure
Article I.
I. There shall be established a Commission on Human Rights in
Armed Conflict (C)IIRAC). It shall consist .of three primary organs
and shall carry out the functions herein provided in accordanc" with
the principles prescribed.
2. The three primary organs shall be:
a. The Council of Ministers.
b. The High Commissioner.
c. The Hearings and Arbitration Council.
Chapter II. Council of Ministers.
Article 2.
1. The Council of Ministers shall be composed of cne representative
from each signatory to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the present
Covenant.
2. Each signatory representative shall have one vote. Important
questions shall be decided by a two-thirds vote of those present
and not abstaining. All other matters, including whether a matter
is an important question, shall be decided by a simple majority
vote of those present and not abstaining.
Article 3.
1. The Council of Ministers shall meet periodically but shall be
so organized as to be able to function continuously.
Article 4.
1. The Council of Ministers shall adopt its own rules of proce-
dure. It shall elect its President at each session, and may es-
tkblish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary.
2. There shall be established two primary subsidiary organs which
shall serve the Commission in advisory and other capacities with
powers outlined by the Council of Ministers which shall include
the value identification, investigative and other functions deemed-
necessary for the proper performance of their roles. The High Com-
missioner and the Hearings and Arbitration Council may directly
utilize their services, and Parties to the Covenant and seek their
advice through the office of the High Cowmissioner.
3. The two primary advisory organs shall be:
a. Advisory Committees on:
(1) Science and Technology.
(2) Military Affairs.
(3) Law and Policy.
(4) Economic Affairs.
(5) Administrative Affairs.
(6) Education and Commpnication.
b. Working Groups for.
(1) Africa.
(2) America.
(3) Asia and Far East.
(4) Europe.
(5) Near East.
Article 5. The Council of inisters shall be the primary deliberative
body and may discuss any questions or matters withing the scope
of the 1949 Geneva.Conventions, the present Covenant, and any
subsequent protocols or amendments. The Council of Ministers
may also propose or initiate studies, investigations, or measures
of law implementation, and may make reconendations for the
purpose of promoting the effective implementation of Convention
law and principles or require reports of law implementation from
Parties to the Covenant. Each Party to the Covenant shall respect
the recommendations and decisions ef the Council and shall facilitate
their observance in all circumstances.
Article 6.
1. The Council of Ministers can make authoritative interpretations
of the Convention precepts or the application of those precepts to
specific situations, andmay formulate criteria for normative
guidance, It may also seek legal determinations through the
International Court of Justice.
2. The Council of Ministers may formulate new standards or
Convention law to be subsequently ratified by Parties, and shall
make continued studies in that regard. The Council of Ministers
or its subsidiary organs shall receive annual reports on law
development and implementation as requested in order to facilitate
this function.
Article 7. The Council of Ministers should coordinate its activities with
the ICRC and any other entity established under this Covenant, and
it can direct the activities of the subsidiary organs of the Council
and make recommendations to other Lommission entities. The
Council may also coordinate its activities with other international
organizations or private entities as desirable. The Council can
receive communications from any source.
Article 8. Any Party to the Geneva Conventions and this Covenant may
bring zatters relevant to such legal instruments to the attention
of the Council of Ministers. The High Commissioner may also
bring relevant matters to the attention of the Council of inist-irs
and may participate In the discussions as a non-voting member.
The High Commisionor may also call a special meeti'ng of the
Council for that purpose. Other entities or persons may bring
matters to the attention of the Council according to the procedures
adopted by the Council for that purpose.
Chapter III. The High Commissioner.
Article 9.
1. The High Comissioner shall be the chief executive for Conven-
tion implementation and shall be assisted by a staff and subsidiary
organs which he may require and appoint. Ile shall act as the
Commission's primary representative and the functions of his
office shall be financed through the Council of Ministers.
2. The High Comissioner shall be appointed by the Council
of Ministers for a term of three years of until such time as he
is replaced by a vote of the Council thereafter.
3. The High Commissioner shall perform such other functions
as are entrusted to him by the Council of Ministers or the Hearings
and Arbitration Council.
Article 10. The High Commissioner, his staff and subsidiary entities
shall perform the executive functions in such a manner that the
office shall remain international in nature. Each Party to the
Covenant unertakes to respect the character of -the responsibilitis
of the High Commissioner and to lend necessary.support to his
efforts.
Article 11. The High Commissioner shall coordinate his activities with
other entities of the Commission and may communicate with such
entities or persons as he deemc necessary for the performance of
the responsibilities of his office. His powers under Article 8 ard
further recognized in this regard.
Article 12.
1. The High Commissioner can direct staff and subsidiary activity
for the purpose of Convention implementation, and with the approval
of the Council of Ministers he may send such subsidiary organs as
he deems necessary for the proper execution of his duties into any
country which is a Party to this Covenant. He may also send sub-
sidiary organs into any country upon request.
2. There shall exist Protection Agencies which will perform such
investigative, protective, humanitarian, and supervisory activities
as directed by the High Commissioner. The Protection Agencies
shall be set up by the High Commissioner with the approval of the
Cotncil of Ministers in such a manner that they are able to fuaction
on a continuous basis. The Protection Agencies shall have all the
power and responsibilities of a Protecting Power under the 1949
*Geneva Conventions, except that their activities shall at all times
reflect the international character of the office of the ligh Commis-
sioner, and they shall coordinate their activities with those of the
ICRC.
3. There shall exiut Convention Implementation Advisers who may
serve under the direction of the High Comnissioner as national
implementing advisers to consenting Parties to the Covenant or
other entities as may be required. The Convention Implementa-
tion Advisers shall coordinate their activities with other entities
of the Commission, bur snail remain under tie direction of the
High ComLissioner and shall reflect the international charac'ter
of his office at all times.
Article 13. The High Commis3ioner can request that reports of law
implementation be made by Parties to the Covenant and can
initiate studies or investigations through his staff and subsidiary
organs, through the-tmo primary advisory bodies to the Council
of Ministers, or through the Hearings and Arbitration Council.
Chapter IV. Hearings and Arbitration Council.
Article 14. The Hearings and Arbitration Council shall operate as
the primary conciliation organ of the Commission and shall
consist of such members as are appointed by the Council of
Ministers for a term of three years or until replaced.
Article 15.
1. The Hearings and. Arbitration Council may conduct formal
hearings into any matter at the reqtest of either the High
Commisrioner or the Council of Ministers; and may arbitrate
any matter broughtfor its decision by consenting Parties to
the Covenant, which Parties shall be bound to comply with the
decision.
2. The Hearings and Arbitration Council shall establish rules
of procedure which are approved by the Council of Ministers.
Article 16. Nothing in Articles 14 or 15 shall preclude the use of
other methods of conflict resolution or conciliation available to
the Parties to the Covenant, nor shall either article impair the
obligations of Parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions to implement
the law in all circumstances and to utilize conciliation methods
as necessary.
Chapter V. Miscellaneous Provisions.
Article 17. The provisions of this Covenant are without prejudice to
the responsibilities of Parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions or
the provisions of the Charter of the Uni ted Nations and the respective
responsibilities of its various entities.
Article 18.
1. The Commission shall enjoy in the territory of each of the Parties
to the Covenant such legal capacity as may be necessary for the
exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Council of 11inisters -and officials of the
Commission shall enjoy such priviledges and immunities as are
necessary for the exercise of their organizational functions.
Article 19.
1. The present Covenant is open to signature and ratification by
any Party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its Protocols or
amendments.
2. Instruments ratified shall be deposited with the Swiss Federal
Council and the Secretary General of the United Nations.
3. The present Covenant shall enter into force three months after
the date of deposit with the Swiss Federal Council of the thirty-fifth
instrument of ratification.
4. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese, French, Russian,
English, and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited
in the archives of the United Nations and made available by the
Secretary General.
5. Revocation shall be made in writing in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
6. No reservations to the articles of this Covenant will be accepted.
IN WITNESS HEREOF:
AMNEX B .
PROTOCOL TO THS 19- GENEVA O:!:EXTTC9', NO. 3
Each H(igh Contracting Party undertakes to enact any legislation
necessary to provide effective judicial remedies for any person pro-
tected by the Conventions. In all circtrnstances the individual right
to effective relief and compeasation for infringement of his rights
under the Conventions shall be rdspecred, implemented, and protected
by each High Contracting Party.
Any violation of any article of the Geneva ConVentions which re-
sults In direct injury to a person protected under the ConvenLions can
constitute the basis for an individual cause of action as guaranteed
here by the High Contracting Pattie. ..The cause of action can be agaphst
another individual,group, organization, "r 'against the state itself.
The indiridual right of action shall.not affect any oiher liability
which an individual, group, organization,--or high Cont*acting P.Iaty
incurs. Furthermore, if an individual has exhausted procedures iip)h-
mented under the present Protocol, he may petition appropriate inter-
national bodies for relief or action.
